Commentary. Reforming teachers' pay: incentive payments, collegiate ethos and UK policy
AbstractWe examine the economic rationale for the expansion of incentive pay for school-teachers in England and Wales. While incentive pay usually improves performance in terms of targeted output, research also suggests that dysfunctional behaviour is likely, particularly in occupations with multiple goals such as teaching. We develop an economic analysis of the 'threat to collegiate ethos' argument of those opposing increased use of incentive pay. This analysis suggests that the presence of asymmetric information, externalities and teamwork effects can provide a rationale for encouraging professional motivation. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Cambridge Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
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- Nick Adnett & Peter Davies, 2005. "Competition between or within schools? Re-assessing school choice," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 109-121.
- David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2006. "Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4675, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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