The Allocation of Merit Pay in Academia
AbstractThis paper investigates whether the widespread awarding of faculty merit pay at a large public university accurately reflects productivity. We show that pairwise voting on a quality standard by a committee can in theory be consistent with observed allocation patterns. However, the data indicate only nominal adherence to a quality standard. Departments with more severe compression issues are more likely to award merit pay as a countermeasure and some departments appear to be motivated by nonpecuniary incentives. Much of the variance in merit pay allocation remains unexplained. These results suggest reform is needed to improve transparency in the merit system.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Towson University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010-13.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision: Jul 2010
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-07-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EDU-2010-07-24 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2010-07-24 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2010-07-24 (Sociology of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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02-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- The strange dynamics of faculty merit pay
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-08-20 14:28:00
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