Academic Tenure, Posttenure Effort, and Contractual Damages
AbstractIn this article we explore the incentive properties of academic tenure relative to alternatives that might be substitutes for tenure, in particular contractual damages. We emphasize the role of tenure in providing an incentive for incumbent faculty to reveal the characteristics of recruits and to maintain their own performance posttenure. Our results suggest that tenure is just one of many mechanisms potentially able to achieve honest revelation. (JEL I2, K0, L2) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
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- Finn Christensen & James Manley & Louise Laurence, 2011. "The Allocation of Merit Pay in Academia: A Case Study," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(2), pages 1548-1562.
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- Michael Rauber & Heinrich Ursprung, 2007. "Life Cycle and Cohort Productivity in Economic Research: The Case of Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 2093, CESifo Group Munich.
- Finn Christensen & James Manley & Louise Laurence, 2010. "The Allocation of Merit Pay in Academia," Working Papers 2010-13, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2010.
- Chen, Zhao & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2009. "Incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 300-308, March.
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