The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and Evidence
AbstractUsing incentive pay to improve public-sector efficiency is an important component of the UK government's public-service modernization agenda. In this paper, we review the important issues in performance pay in the public sector, and summarize the evidence on its effects. We consider how optimal incentives for public-sector workers may differ from those in the private sector and, if they do, what types of incentives are more appropriate for the public sector. We investigate the reasons for the infrequent use of explicit incentives in the public sector. We summarize evidence of particular relevance to the public sector, on issues such as the impact on output of incentive pay schemes, gaming and dysfunctional behaviour, multiple principals, intrinsic motivation, and teamwork. Finally, we comment on the design of new policies being introduced in the UK public sector in the light of the theoretical arguments and the evidence. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://oxrep.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.