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The Determinants of Performance Appraisal Systems: A Note (Do Brown and Heywood’s Results for Australia Hold Up for Britain?)

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Author Info
John T. Addison () (Queen’s University Belfast and IZA)
Clive R. Belfield () (Queens College, City University of New York)

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Abstract

This paper offers a replication for Britain of Brown and Heywood’s analysis of the determinants of performance appraisal in Australia. Although there are some important limiting differences between our two datasets - the AWIRS and the WERS - we reach one central point of agreement and one intriguing shared insight. First, performance appraisal is negatively associated with tenure: where employers cannot rely on the carrot of deferred pay or the stick of dismissal to motivate workers they will tend to rely more on monitoring, ceteris paribus. Alternatively put, when the probability of job separation is greater, the influence of deferred compensation diminishes. Second, there is also some suggestion in the data that employer monitoring and performance pay may be complementary. However, consonant with the disparate results from the wider literature, there is more modest agreement on the contribution of specific HRM practices, and still less on the role of job control. Finally, there is no carry over to Britain of the structural determinants identified by Brown and Heywood.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3065.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3065

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Related research
Keywords: performance appraisal; monitoring; deferred compensation; performance pay; HRM practices; worker tenure; unionism;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics

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