Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Determinants of Performance Appraisal Systems: A Note (Do Brown and Heywood’s Results for Australia Hold Up for Britain?)

Contents:

Author Info

  • Addison, John T.

    ()
    (University of South Carolina)

  • Belfield, Clive R.

    ()
    (Queens College, CUNY)

Abstract

This paper offers a replication for Britain of Brown and Heywood’s analysis of the determinants of performance appraisal in Australia. Although there are some important limiting differences between our two datasets – the AWIRS and the WERS – we reach one central point of agreement and one intriguing shared insight. First, performance appraisal is negatively associated with tenure: where employers cannot rely on the carrot of deferred pay or the stick of dismissal to motivate workers they will tend to rely more on monitoring, ceteris paribus. Alternatively put, when the probability of job separation is greater, the influence of deferred compensation diminishes. Second, there is also some suggestion in the data that employer monitoring and performance pay may be complementary. However, consonant with the disparate results from the wider literature, there is more modest agreement on the contribution of specific HRM practices, and still less on the role of job control. Finally, there is no carry over to Britain of the structural determinants identified by Brown and Heywood.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp3065.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3065.

as in new window
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2008, 46 (3), 521 - 531
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3065

Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information:
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:

Related research

Keywords: HRM practices; performance appraisal; monitoring; deferred compensation; performance pay; worker tenure; unionism;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bayo-Moriones, Alberto & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique & Martinez-de-Morentin, Sara, 2011. "Performance Appraisal: Dimensions and Determinants," IZA Discussion Papers 5623, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2011. "Variable Pay, Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany," Research Papers in Economics, University of Trier, Department of Economics 2011-05, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
  3. Alejandro Arrieta & Ariadna García-Prado, 2012. "Cost Sharing and Hospitalizations for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1211, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  4. David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2009. "Institutions and the management of human resources: incentive pay systems in France and Great Britain," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 25423, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Uwe Jirjahn & Erik Poutsma, 2011. "The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data," Research Papers in Economics, University of Trier, Department of Economics 2011-02, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
  6. Matthias Lang, 2012. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Mar 2014.
  7. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Jose Enrique Galdon-Sanchez & Sara Martinez-de-Morentin, 2012. "The Diffusion of Pay for Performance Across Occupations," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1210, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  8. David Marsden, 2010. "Individual Voice in Employment Relationships: A Comparison Under Different Collective Voice Regimes," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp1006, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  9. Richard Belfield & David Marsden, 2009. "Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp0941, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  10. Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2012. "The Economics of Performance Appraisals," TEPP Working Paper, TEPP 2012-15, TEPP.
  11. David Marsden, 2011. "Individual Voice in Employment Relationships: A Comparison Under Different Forms of Workplace Representation," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp1070, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3065. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.