IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gre/wpaper/2014-03.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do People Stand by their Commitments? Evidence from Classroom Experiments

Author

Listed:
  • Agnès Festré

    (CRIISEA
    University of Picardie - Jules Verne)

  • Pierre Garrouste

    (GREDEG CNRS
    University of Nice Sophia Antipolis)

Abstract

In this paper we test the fulfillment of commitments in terms of effort made by students under an incentive contract but without strategic interactions. Accordingly it is an experimental contribution to decision theory. The experiments took place in classrooms during class time. Students have to announce a level and realize a level of effort virtually. The two levels of effort can differ and the game is made in such a way that students have interest not the stand by their commitments that to make their two levels of effort different. The results show however that an important percentage of students respect their commitment and that a freezing effect can be identified.

Suggested Citation

  • Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2014. "Do People Stand by their Commitments? Evidence from Classroom Experiments," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-03, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2014-03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://195.220.198.217/GREDEG-WP-2014-03.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2014
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    2. Sarah Brown & Jolian McHardy & Robert McNabb & Karl Taylor, 2011. "Workplace Performance, Worker Commitment, and Loyalty," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 925-955, September.
    3. Cristina Bicchieri, 2002. "Covenants without Swords," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(2), pages 192-228, May.
    4. Jacquemet, Nicolas & Joule, Robert-Vincent & Luchini, Stéphane & Shogren, Jason F., 2013. "Preference elicitation under oath," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 110-132.
    5. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
    6. Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
    7. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Promises, Threats and Fairness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 397-420, April.
    8. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2011. "Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 805-855.
    9. Charness, Gary & Du, Ninghua & Yang, Chun-Lei & Yao, Lan, 2013. "Promises in contract design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 194-208.
    10. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    11. Cristiano Antonelli & Francesco Quatraro, 2014. "The effects of biased technological changes on total factor productivity: a rejoinder and new empirical evidence," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 281-299, April.
    12. Pettit, Philip, 2005. "Construing Sen On Commitment," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 15-32, April.
    13. Francis Green, 2008. "Leeway for the Loyal: A Model of Employee Discretion," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 46(1), pages 1-32, March.
    14. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
    15. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2015. "Theory And Evidence In Psychology And Economics About Motivation Crowding Out: A Possible Convergence?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 339-356, April.
    16. Brown Kruse, Jamie & Thompson, Mark A., 2001. "A comparison of salient rewards in experiments: money and class points," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 113-117, December.
    17. N. Etchart-Vincent, 2006. "Experimenting in the lab in economics and monetary incentives," Post-Print hal-00716784, HAL.
    18. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Kuhn, Michael A., 2013. "Experimental methods: Extra-laboratory experiments-extending the reach of experimental economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 93-100.
    19. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Marty, 2014. "Towards an Economics of Convention-based Approach of the European Competition Policy," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-06, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    2. Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2021. "Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 139-167, February.
    3. Morita, Hodaka & Servátka, Maroš, 2013. "Group identity and relation-specific investment: An experimental investigation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 95-109.
    4. Gary Bolton & Eugen Dimant & Ulrich Schmidt, 2018. "When a Nudge Backfires. Using Observation with Social and Economic Incentives to Promote Pro-Social Behavior," PPE Working Papers 0017, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    5. Ayelet Gneezy & Alex Imas & Amber Brown & Leif D. Nelson & Michael I. Norton, 2012. "Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 179-187, January.
    6. Nyborg, Karine, 2011. "I don't want to hear about it: Rational ignorance among duty-oriented consumers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 263-274, August.
    7. Prasenjit Banerjee & Vegard Iversen & Sandip Mitra & Antonio Nicolò & Kunal Sen, 2018. "Politicians and Their Promises in an Uncertain World: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in India," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1806, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    8. Byun, Seong, 2022. "The role of intrinsic incentives and corporate culture in motivating innovation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    9. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2015. "The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 32-39.
    10. Simon Cornée & Marc Jegers & Ariane Szafarz, 2018. "A Theory of Social Finance," Working Papers halshs-01717167, HAL.
    11. Ye, Xiaoyang & Zhai, Muxin & Feng, Li & Xie, A’na & Wang, Weimin & Wu, Hongbin, 2022. "Still want to be a doctor? Medical student dropout in the era of COVID-19," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 122-139.
    12. Chen, Daniel L. & Frankenreiter, Jens & Yeh, Susan, 2016. "Judicial Compliance in District Courts," IAST Working Papers 16-55, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    13. Luigino Bruni & Vittorio Pelligra & Tommaso Reggiani & Matteo Rizzolli, 2020. "The Pied Piper: Prizes, Incentives, and Motivation Crowding-in," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 166(3), pages 643-658, October.
    14. Yadi Yang, 2021. "A Survey Of The Hold‐Up Problem In The Experimental Economics Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 227-249, February.
    15. Oliver Masakure & Kris Gerhardt, 2016. "Employee Commitment and Wages in the Private Sector," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 30(1), pages 38-60, March.
    16. Beinhocker, Eric & Dhami, Sanjit, 2019. "The Behavioral Foundations of New Economic Thinking," INET Oxford Working Papers 2019-13, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    17. Gary E. Bolton & Eugen Dimant & Ulrich Schmidt, 2020. "When a Nudge Backfires: Combining (Im)Plausible Deniability with Social and Economic Incentives to Promote Behavioral Change," CESifo Working Paper Series 8070, CESifo.
    18. Sanjit Dhami, 2017. "Human Ethics and Virtues: Rethinking the Homo-Economicus Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 6836, CESifo.
    19. Masakure, Oliver, 2016. "The effect of employee loyalty on wages," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 274-298.
    20. Andreoni, James & Serra-Garcia, Marta, 2021. "Time inconsistent charitable giving," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    commitment; freezing effect; classroom experiments; level of effort;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2014-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Patrice Bougette (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/credcfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.