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Unions and the incidence of performance linked pay schemes in Britain

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  • Gregg, P. A.
  • Machin, S. J.

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between trade unions and the incidence of share ownership, profit sharing and value added schemes in Britain. The first two schemes are more common in the union sector whilst the third occurs more in non-union establishments. A distinction is made between weak and strong unions and it is found that performance linked pay schemes are in general less likely to be present if an establishment has a strong union rather than a weak one.
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Suggested Citation

  • Gregg, P. A. & Machin, S. J., 1988. "Unions and the incidence of performance linked pay schemes in Britain," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 91-107, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:6:y:1988:i:1:p:91-107
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    Cited by:

    1. N Millward, 1993. "Uses of the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys by British Labour Economists," CEP Discussion Papers dp0145, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Long, Richard J. & Fang, Tony, 2013. "Profit Sharing and Workplace Productivity: Does Teamwork Play a Role?," IZA Discussion Papers 7869, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Vladimir Pecheu, 2021. "Profit Sharing as a Bargaining Weapon Against Unions," Working Papers halshs-03247551, HAL.
    4. Martin Conyon & Richard B. Freeman, 2004. "Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance U.K. Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980–2000, pages 109-146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Andrew Pendleton & Erik Poutsma & Chris Brewster & Jos van Ommeren, 2002. "Employee share ownership and profit-sharing in the European Union: incidence, company characteristics, and union representation," Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, , vol. 8(1), pages 47-62, February.
    6. David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2010. "Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 48(2), pages 235-283, June.
    7. Millward, N., 1993. "Uses of the workplace industrial relations surveys by British labour economists," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20964, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Heywood, John S. & Jirjahn, Uwe, 2009. "Profit sharing and firm size: The role of team production," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 246-258, August.
    9. Robert Drago & John S. Heywood, 1994. "The Choice of Payment Schemes: Australian Establishment Data," Labor and Demography 9402001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Feb 1994.
    10. Min Park, 2021. "Unionized employees’ influence on executive compensation: Evidence from Korea," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 59(4), pages 1049-1083, December.
    11. Thomas Cornelissen & John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2010. "Profit Sharing and Reciprocity: Theory and Survey Evidence," Research Papers in Economics 2010-04, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    12. Uwe Jirjahn, 2018. "The adoption and termination of profit sharing for employees: does management’s attitude play a role?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(2), pages 108-127, January.
    13. Thomas Cornelissen & John Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2014. "Reciprocity and Profit Sharing: Is There an Inverse U-shaped Relationship?," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 205-225, June.
    14. Douglas L. Kruse, 1996. "Why Do Firms Adopt Profit-Sharing and Employee Ownership Plans?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 34(4), pages 515-538, December.
    15. Origo, Federica, 2009. "Flexible pay, firm performance and the role of unions. New evidence from Italy," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 64-78, January.
    16. Douglas Kruse & Joseph Blasi, 1995. "Employee Ownership, Employee Attitudes, and Firm Performance," NBER Working Papers 5277, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi & Rhokeun Park, 2010. "Shared Capitalism in the U.S. Economy: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Employee Views of Financial Participation in Enterprises," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 41-75, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Vladimir Pecheu, 2021. "Profit Sharing as a Bargaining Weapon Against Unions," AMSE Working Papers 2135, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.

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