Designing electiricty transmission auctions: an introduction to the relevant literature
AbstractThe UK has ambitious plans for exploiting offshore wind for electricity production in order to meet its challenging target under the EU Renewable Energy Directive. This could involve investing up to £20bn in transmission assets to bring electricity ashore. An investment of this magnitude calls for an efficient mechanism to determine which projects get financed and ensuring that only those projects that are selected can be delivered at least costs to consumers. The electricity regulator’s ongoing tender auctions are likely to work well for point-to-point transmission and for networks already built. However, it is still unclear what kinds of models could be considered for complex meshed offshore (and onshore) networks where licences are granted not only to own and operate, but also to build a transmission network. This paper provides an extensive survey on the current theory and experience of auctions. The main objective is to discuss the design of auctions for transmission assets in which bidding for packages of transmission assets is a possibility.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 1245.
Date of creation: 26 Oct 2012
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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
Energy Transmission; Auction Design; Combinatorial Auctions; Package Bidding;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2012-11-03 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2012-11-03 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-REG-2012-11-03 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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