Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Erdil, Aytek
  • Klemperer, Paul

Abstract

We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, "Reference Rules," to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost riskless, profitable deviations from "truthful bidding" are often easy for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP7487.asp
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7487.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7487

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: combinatorial auction; core; core-selecting auction; multi-object auction; package auction; robust design; simultaneous ascending auction; Vickrey; Vickrey auction;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Assignment Messages and Exchanges," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 08-014, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  2. Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7395, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  4. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
  5. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  6. Robert Day & Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Core-selecting package auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 393-407, March.
  7. Robert W. Day & S. Raghavan, 2007. "Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1389-1406, September.
  8. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March.
  9. Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg, 2004. "Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
  10. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Crampton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 03-034, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  11. Robert Day & Peter Cramton, 2008. "Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 08qcspr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Sano, Ryuji, 2012. "Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 637-650.
  2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo CARF-F-258, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  3. Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektas, . "Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business 2012-E23, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  4. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2014. "An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 14/06, Department of Economics, University of York.
  5. Kaplan, Todd R & Zamir, Shmuel, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," MPRA Paper 54656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Thomas Greve & Michael G. Pollitt Author-X-Name-First Michael, . "Network Procurement Auctions," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1347, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  7. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
  8. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
  9. Mochon, A. & Saez, Y. & Gomez-Barroso, J.L. & Isasi, P., 2012. "Exploring pricing rules in combinatorial sealed-bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 462-478.
  10. Akiyoshi Shioura & Zaifu Yang, 2013. "Equilibrium, Auction, Multiple Substitutes and Complements," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 13/17, Department of Economics, University of York.
  11. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Oleg V. Baranov, 2014. "Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 446-51, May.
  12. Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2013. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 13/31, Department of Economics, University of York.
  13. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2013. "Gaming in Combinatorial Clock Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-027/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 Dec 2013.
  14. Jacob K. Goeree & Yuanchuan Lien, 2009. "On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions," IEW - Working Papers 452, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  15. Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Jürgen Wolf, 2013. "Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 511-545, December.
  16. Ott, Marion & Beck, Marissa, 2013. "Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79946, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  17. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
  18. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00575076 is not listed on IDEAS

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7487. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.