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Reciprocity in a Two Part Dictator Game

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Abstract

We conduct a dictator game experiment in which recipients in an initial game become dictators in a second game. When the subjects paired remain the same, the amount sent back is strongly correlated with the amount received, despite the fact that the interaction is anonymous and is known to be one-time and zero-sum in nature. When the initial recipient is instead paired with a third subject, a less significant and lower-valued correlation between amounts received and sent is exhibited. Intelligence and personality test results, gender, and other characteristics also help to predict sending behavior and degree of reciprocity.

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 99-28.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-28

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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References

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  1. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin A & Smith, Vernon L, 1998. "Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 335-52, July.
  2. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
  3. Ben-Ner, Avner & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "On some implications of evolutionary psychology for the study of preferences and institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 91-99, September.
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  6. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
  7. A. Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, 1997. "Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis," Working Papers 97-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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  12. Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
  13. Joseph Henrich & Robert Boyd & Samuel Bowles & Colin Camerer & Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis & Richard McElreath, 2001. "Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-scale Societies," Working Papers 01-01-007, Santa Fe Institute.
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  17. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2003. "Altruistic Punishment in Humans," Microeconomics 0305006, EconWPA.
  18. Avner Ben-Ner & Famin Kong & Louis Putterman, . "Share and Share Alike? Intelligence, Socialization, Personality, and Gender-Pairing as Determinants of Giving," Working Papers 1002, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
  19. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 1997. "A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1889, David K. Levine.
  20. Eckel, Catherine, 1999. "Commentary on "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework."," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 47-48, December.
  21. Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick & Elena Katok, 1998. "Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 269-299.
  22. Joel M. Guttman & Shmuel Nitzan & Uriel Spiegel, 1992. "Rent Seeking And Social Investment In Taste Change," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 31-42, 03.
  23. Camerer, Colin F & Thaler, Richard H, 1995. "Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-19, Spring.
  24. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Joseph G. Eisenhauer, 2006. "The Shadow Price of Morality," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 437-456, Summer.
  2. Jeffrey Carpenter & Allison Liati & Brian Vickery, 2006. "They Come to Play: Supply Effects in an Economic Experiment," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0602, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  3. Bonein Aurélie & Serra Daniel, 2007. "Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity," Working Papers 07-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Apr 2007.
  4. Croson, Rachel & Konow, James, 2009. "Social Preferences and Moral Biases," MPRA Paper 2729, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2008.
  5. Avner Ben-Ner & Famin Kong & Louis Putterman, . "Share and Share Alike? Intelligence, Socialization, Personality, and Gender-Pairing as Determinants of Giving," Working Papers 1002, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
  6. Avner Ben-Ner & Brian P. McCall & Massoud Stephane & Hua Wang, 2006. "Identity and Self-Other Differentiation in Work and Giving Behaviors: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2006.103, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  7. Jordi Brandts & Enrique Fatás, 2004. "Endogenous social influence in an experimental dilemma game," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces 2004/59, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  8. Pamela Schmitt & Kurtis Swope & Robert Shupp & Justin Mayer, 2004. "Personality Preferences and Pre-Commitment: Behavioral Explanations in Ultimatum Games," Departmental Working Papers 6, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
  9. Marius Brülhart & Jean-Claude Usunier, 2004. "Verified Trust: Reciprocity, Altruism, and Noise in Trust Games," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 04.15, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  10. Ben-Ner, Avner & Kramer, Amit & Levy, Ori, 2008. "Economic and hypothetical dictator game experiments: Incentive effects at the individual level," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1775-1784, October.
  11. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2006. "Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game," Working Papers 06-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  12. Dannenberg, Astrid & Riechmann, Thomas & Sturm, Bodo & Vogt, Carsten, 2010. "Stability and explanatory power of inequality aversion: an investigation of the house money effect," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-006, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  13. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, . "Trust in the New Economy," Working Papers 1102, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
  14. Perugini, Marco & Tan, Jonathan H. W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2005. "Which is the More Predictable Gender? Public Good Contribution and Personality," Discussion Papers 236, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
  15. Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, 2009. "Gender Differences in Preferences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 448-74, June.
  16. Julia Muller & Christiane Schwieren, 2012. "What can the Big Five Personality Factors contribute to explain Small-Scale Economic Behavior?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-028/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  17. Rafael Di Tella & Ricardo Pérez-Truglia, 2010. "Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs About Others," NBER Working Papers 16645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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