Trust and reciprocity: implications of game triads and social contexts
AbstractTrust and reciprocity have been observed in experiments with simple stylized games. Such characteristics of social preferences have been observed to vary with procedures that alter the social environment in an experiment, such as single blind or double blind payoff protocols. This paper reports an experiment on the effects of a change in the social context of an experiment on trust and reciprocity. The strong social context introduces a stylized version of a characteristic of everyday life in large cities: a player in one game knows that other games lie ahead but does not know precisely what those games will turn out to be nor with whom they will be played.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal New Zealand Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 43 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RNZP20
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- Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Papa Stefano, 2013. "Measuring trust, reciprocity and altruism by counterfactuals," wp.comunite 0099, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Papa Stefano, 2012. "The triadic design to identify trust and reciprocity: Extensions and robustness," wp.comunite 0096, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
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