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Trust and reciprocity: implications of game triads and social contexts

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  • James Cox

Abstract

Trust and reciprocity have been observed in experiments with simple stylized games. Such characteristics of social preferences have been observed to vary with procedures that alter the social environment in an experiment, such as single blind or double blind payoff protocols. This paper reports an experiment on the effects of a change in the social context of an experiment on trust and reciprocity. The strong social context introduces a stylized version of a characteristic of everyday life in large cities: a player in one game knows that other games lie ahead but does not know precisely what those games will turn out to be nor with whom they will be played.

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File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00779950903005473
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal New Zealand Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 43 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 89-104

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Handle: RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:43:y:2009:i:2:p:89-104

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Related research

Keywords: experiments; trust; reciprocity; social context;

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References

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  1. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  2. James Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2004. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental 0406001, EconWPA.
  3. James C. Cox & Klarita Sadiraj & Vjollca Vjollca, . "Implications of Trust, Fear, and Reciprocity for Modeling Economic Behavior," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-10, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  4. James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2008. "Revealed Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(1), pages 31-69, 01.
  5. Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Papa Stefano, 2012. "The triadic design to identify trust and reciprocity: Extensions and robustness," wp.comunite 0096, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  2. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Papa Stefano, 2013. "Measuring trust, reciprocity and altruism by counterfactuals," wp.comunite 0099, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  3. Servátka, Maros, 2010. "Does generosity generate generosity? An experimental study of reputation effects in a dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 11-17, January.

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