Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements
AbstractIs mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al.  report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games. We assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their endowments. We find that cooperation is lower in common property trust games than in private property trust games, which is an idiosyncratic prediction of revealed altruism theory .
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series with number 2010-07.
Date of creation: Aug 2010
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2010-08-14 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-08-14 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-08-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IPR-2010-08-14 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-SOC-2010-08-14 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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