Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior
AbstractThis paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral hypothesis tests of within-subjects vs. across-subjects designs, single-blind vs. double-blind payoffs, random vs. dictator first-mover control treatments, and strategy responses vs. sequential play. Copyright Economic Science Association 2008
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
Experiments; Theory; Parsimony; Trust; Fear; Reciprocity; Methodology;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Maroš Servátka, 2007.
"Does Generosity Generate Generosity? An Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Dictator Game,"
Working Papers in Economics
07/03, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Servátka, Maros, 2010. "Does generosity generate generosity? An experimental study of reputation effects in a dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 11-17, January.
- James Cox, 2009.
"Trust and reciprocity: implications of game triads and social contexts,"
New Zealand Economic Papers,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(2), pages 89-104.
- James C. Cox, 2007. "Trust and Reciprocity: Implications of Game Triads and Social Contexts," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-08, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised May 2008.
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011.
"Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?,"
Handbook of Labor Economics,
- Gary Charness & Peter J. Kuhn, 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," NBER Working Papers 15913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter J., 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," IZA Discussion Papers 4941, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.