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Platform Stickiness in a Spatial Voting Model

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  • L. Lambertini

Abstract

The spatial voting approach is extended to account for the existence of a loyalty effect driving the choice of parties' platforms during elections. There emerges a non-linear relationship between these variable, whereby a party sticking to its historical heritage may lose to a rival more keen to approach the position of the median voter, whose pivotal role is also investigated.

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Paper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number 597.

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Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:597

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  1. Luca Lambertini, 1994. "Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly," Working Papers 205, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  2. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. " Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-36, June.
  3. Shlomo Weber, 1997. "Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 31-56.
  4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  5. Steffen Huck & Vicki Knoblauch & Wieland Müller, 2006. "Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 557-570, December.
  6. Patty, John Wiggs, 2005. "Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 523-536, May.
  7. Adams, James, 2000. " Multicandidate Equilibrium in American Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 297-325, June.
  8. Norman Schofield, 2006. "Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 183-203, December.
  9. Kollman, Ken & Miller, John H. & Page, Scott E., 1997. "Landscape formation in a spatial voting model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 121-130, August.
  10. Adams, James, 1999. " Policy Divergence in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(1-2), pages 103-22, July.
  11. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
  12. McKelvey, Richard D. & Patty, John W., 2006. "A theory of voting in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 155-180, October.
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