Platform Stickiness in a Spatial Voting Model
AbstractThe spatial voting approach is extended to account for the existence of a loyalty effect driving the choice of parties' platforms during elections. There emerges a non-linear relationship between these variable, whereby a party sticking to its historical heritage may lose to a rival more keen to approach the position of the median voter, whose pivotal role is also investigated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number 597.
Date of creation: Jun 2007
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- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-08-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2007-08-14 (Positive Political Economics)
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