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Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing

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  • Steffen Huck
  • Vicki Knoblauch
  • Wieland Müller

Abstract

We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium (Osborne [1993]) but no - or only very complex - subgame-perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by analyzing the subgame-perfect equilibria in a three-candidate game. Our results show that allowing for endogenous timing can eliminate some of the more unappealing equilibrium characteristics of the standard model.

Suggested Citation

  • Steffen Huck & Vicki Knoblauch & Wieland Müller, 2006. "Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 557-570, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200612)162:4_557:svwet_2.0.tx_2-v
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Osborne Martin J., 1993. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January.
    2. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
    3. Saloner, Garth, 1987. "Cournot duopoly with two production periods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 183-187, June.
    4. Robson, Arthur J, 1990. "Stackelberg and Marshall," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 69-82, March.
    5. Shaked, A, 1982. "Existence and Computation of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for 3-Firms Location Problem," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1-2), pages 93-96, September.
    6. Thomas R. Palfrey, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 139-156.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Lambertini, 2007. "Platform stickiness in a spatial voting model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(40), pages 1-11.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:40:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. L. Lambertini, 2010. "Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand: A Differential Game Approach," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 108-119, April.
    4. Arturo García & Mariel Leal & Sang-Ho Lee, 2019. "Endogenous Timing with a Socially Responsible Firm," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 345-370.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General

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