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Dynamic regulations in non –renewable resources oligopolistic markets

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  • Halkos, George

Abstract

Traditional economic theory, up to the middle of the twentieth century, builds up the production functions regardless the inputs’ scarcity. In the last few decades has been clear that both the inputs are depletable quantities and a lot of constraints are imposed in their usage in order to ensure economic sustainability. Furthermore, the management of exploitation and use of natural resources (either exhaustible or renewable) has been discussed by analyzing dynamic models applying methods of Optimal Control Theory. This theory provides solutions that are concerned with a single decision maker who can control the model dynamics facing a certain performance index to be optimized. In fact, market structures or exploitation patterns are often oligopolistic, i.e. there are several decision makers whose policies influence each other. So, game theoretical approaches are introduced into the discussion. According to the theory of continuous time models of Optimal Control, the appropriate analogue of differential games is used. Roughly, this is the extension of Optimal Control, when there is exactly one decision maker, to the case of N(N≥ 2) decision makers interacting with each other.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 24774.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24774

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Keywords: Nonrenewable resources; dynamic interaction; economic regulation; differential games;

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  1. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1995. "Consistency And Optimality In A Dynamic Game Of Pollution Control I: Competition," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers, Utah State University, Economics Department 28351, Utah State University, Economics Department.
  2. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Yen, Jerome, 1995. "Dynamic Cournot oligopolies with production adjustment costs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 95-101.
  3. Puu, Tonu, 1977. "On the profitability of exhausting natural resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 185-199, September.
  4. Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1992. "The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 155-90, April.
  5. L. Lambertini, 2007. "Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand: A Differential Game Approach," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna 598, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  6. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
  7. Benchekroun, Hassan & Van Long, Ngo, 2002. "Transboundary Fishery: A Differential Game Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(274), pages 207-21, May.
  8. Benchekroun, Hassan, 2003. "Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 214-239, August.
  9. Dockner, Engelbert J. & Sorger, Gerhard, 1996. "Existence and Properties of Equilibria for a Dynamic Game on Productive Assets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 209-227, October.
  10. Dockner, Engelbert & Feichtinger, Gustav & Mehlmann, Alexander, 1989. "Noncooperative solutions for a differential game model of fishery," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-20, January.
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