Probabilistic Voting and Platform Selection in Multi-party Elections
AbstractThe literature on stochastic voting to date has focused almost exclusively on models with only two candidates (or parties). This paper studies multiparty competition with stochastic voting. We look at two different models in which candidates aim to maximize their expected vote, as well as a model where the objective of candidates is rank minimization. The equilibria of these models are derived and characterized. We show that the properties of the equilibria are quite different from those derived in deterministic models. Furthermore, the analysis shows that deterministic voting models are not robust since the introduction of even a minute level of uncertainty leads to a drastic change in predictions. Consequently, we argue that thc deterministic model provides a misleading benchmark. Stochastic models providc a much richer framework, and the nature of the uncertainty in voter choice is a kcy determinant of thc qualitative properties of the equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 94-09.
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 1994, 11, pp. 305-322
Other versions of this item:
- ANDERSON, S.P. & KATZ, A. & THISSE, Jacques-François, 1992. "Probabilistic voting and platform selection in multi-party elections," CORE Discussion Papers 1992046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Anderson, S. P. & Kats, A. & Thisse, J.-F., . "Probabilistic voting and platform selection in multi-party elections," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1130, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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