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Multicandidate Equilibrium in American Elections

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  • Adams, James

Abstract

The United States presidential election of 1992 is an example of a multicandidate contest involving both Democratic and Republican candidates. Using a spatial modelling approach, I analyze candidate policy strategy for such elections, under the assumption that voters choose according to the multivariate voting model of behavioral research. This model represents voters' decisions as probabilistic functions of their policy preferences and political partisanship. I suggest reasons why partisan voting motivates candidates to locate near their party's partisans in the policy space, and illustrate this argument with respect to the 1992 presidential election. The results of computer simulations suggest that these motivations lead to multicandidate spatial equilibria, which are robust to changes in the model's parameters. Partisanship appears to be an important source of stability in multicandidate electoral competition. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Adams, James, 2000. "Multicandidate Equilibrium in American Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 297-325, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:103:y:2000:i:3-4:p:297-325
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Lambertini, 2007. "Platform stickiness in a spatial voting model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(40), pages 1-11.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:40:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. L. Lambertini, 2010. "Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand: A Differential Game Approach," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 108-119, April.
    4. Michael Peress, 2011. "Securing the base: electoral competition under variable turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 87-104, July.
    5. Luca Lambertini, 2014. "Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign," Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, in: Josef Haunschmied & Vladimir M. Veliov & Stefan Wrzaczek (ed.), Dynamic Games in Economics, edition 127, pages 187-204, Springer.

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