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The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games

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  • Caputo, Michael R.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 61 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 198-224

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:61:y:2007:i:2:p:198-224

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, April.
  2. Mohr, Ernst U, 1988. "Appropriation of Common Access Natural Resources through Exploration: The Relevance of the Open-Loop Concept," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(2), pages 307-19, May.
  3. A. Michael Spence, 1979. "Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  4. Margaret E. Slade, 1995. "Empirical Games: The Oligopoly Case," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 368-402, May.
  5. Oniki, Hajime, 1973. "Comparative dynamics (sensitivity analysis) in optimal control theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 265-283, June.
  6. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1982. "A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 671-88, May.
  7. Caputo, Michael R., 1992. "Fundamental symmetries and qualitative properties in the adjustment cost model of the firm," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 99-112.
  8. BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & GAUDET, Gérard, 1997. "On the Profitability of Production Constraints in a Dynamic Natural Resource Oligopoly," Cahiers de recherche 9717, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  9. Caputo, Michael R. & Wilen, James E., 1995. "Optimality conditions and comparative statics for horizon and endpoint choices in optimal control theory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 351-369.
  10. Caputo, Michael R., 1996. "The Envelope Theorem and Comparative Statics of Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, April.
  11. Seierstad, Atle, 1982. "Differentiability properties of the optimal value function in control theory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 303-310, November.
  12. Dockner, Engelbert J. & Sorger, Gerhard, 1996. "Existence and Properties of Equilibria for a Dynamic Game on Productive Assets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 209-227, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Chen Ling & Michael Caputo, 2012. "The Envelope Theorem for Locally Differentiable Nash Equilibria of Discounted and Autonomous Infinite Horizon Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 313-334, September.
  2. Engwerda, Jacob & van Aarle, Bas & Plasmans, Joseph & Weeren, Arie, 2013. "Debt stabilization games in the presence of risk premia," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2525-2546.
  3. L. Lambertini, 2009. "Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand and Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 672, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  4. Van Gorder, Robert A. & Caputo, Michael R., 2010. "Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 1123-1139, June.
  5. Lambertini, Luca & Palestini, Arsen, 2014. "On the feedback solutions of differential oligopoly games with hyperbolic demand curve and capacity accumulation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(1), pages 272-281.
  6. L. Lambertini, 2010. "On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation," Working Papers 692, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  7. L. Lambertini, 2007. "Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand: A Differential Game Approach," Working Papers 598, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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