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Weak and Strong Time Consistency in a Differential Oligopoly Game with Capital Accumulation

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  • R. Cellini

    (University of Catania)

  • L. Lambertini

    (University of Bologna)

Abstract

We illustrate a differential oligopoly game with capital accumulation where the accumulation dynamics of productive capacity is modelled à la Ramsey. The model is solved under the open-loop information structure, to show that it admits an open-loop Nash equilibrium which is indeed a degenerate feedback one and therefore strongly time consistent, even if, by construction, the problem under consideration is not a linear state game.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2008. "Weak and Strong Time Consistency in a Differential Oligopoly Game with Capital Accumulation," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 17-26, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:138:y:2008:i:1:d:10.1007_s10957-008-9432-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10957-008-9432-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Wirl, Franz, 2010. "Dynamic demand and noncompetitive intertemporal output adjustments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 220-229, May.
    2. Lambertini, Luca & Palestini, Arsen, 2014. "On the feedback solutions of differential oligopoly games with hyperbolic demand curve and capacity accumulation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(1), pages 272-281.
    3. Baldini, Massimo & Lambertini, Luca, 2011. "Profit taxation and capital accumulation in a dynamic oligopoly model," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 13-18, January.
    4. L. Lambertini, 2010. "On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation," Working Papers 692, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    5. Lambertini, Luca & Mantovani, Andrea, 2006. "Identifying reaction functions in differential oligopoly games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 252-271, December.
    6. Dragone, Davide, 2009. "I am getting tired: Effort and fatigue in intertemporal decision-making," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 552-562, August.
    7. Shinji Kobayashi, 2015. "On a Dynamic Model of Cooperative and Noncooperative R and D in Oligopoly with Spillovers," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 599-619, December.
    8. Alessandra Buratto & Luca Grosset & Bruno Viscolani, 2012. "ε-Subgame Perfectness of an Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibrium in Linear-State Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 269-279, September.
    9. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2011. "On the feedback solution of a differential oligopoly game with capacity adjustment," Working Papers wp741, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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