On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation
AbstractI characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium of a differential market game with hyperbolic demand where firms are quantity-setters and accumulate capacity over time à la Ramsey. I show that the open-loop solution is subgame perfect. Then, I analyse the feasibility of horizontal mergers, and compare the result generated by the dynamic setup with the merger incentive associated with the static model. It appears that allowing for the role of time makes mergers more likely to occur than they would on the basis of the static setting.
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Date of creation: Feb 2010
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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