Mergers In Asymmetric Stackelberg Markets
AbstractIt is well known that the profitability of horizontal mergers with quantity competition is scarce. However, in an asymmetric Stackelberg market we obtain that some mergers are profitable. Our main result is that mergers among followers become profitable when the followers are inefficient enough. In this case, leaders reduce their output when followers merge and this reduction renders the merger profitable. This merger increases price and welfare is reduced.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2007-14.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Mergers; Asymmetries; Stackelberg.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-06-11 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-06-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2007-06-11 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-06-11 (Microeconomics)
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