By Object or by Effect? The Collusive Potential of First Refusal Contracts
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More about this item
Keywords
Right of first refusal; contract; theory of harm; abuse of bargaining power;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2023-01-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2023-01-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2023-01-09 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2023-01-09 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2023-01-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2023-01-09 (Regulation)
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