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Asymmetric collusion with growing demand

Author

Listed:
  • António Brandão

    (Cef.up and Faculdade de Economia do Porto.)

  • Joana Pinho

    (Cef.up and Faculdade de Economia do Porto.)

  • Hélder Vasconcelos

    (Cef.up and Faculdade de Economia do Porto.)

Abstract

We characterize collusion sustainability in markets where demand growth may trigger the entry of a new firm whose efficiency may be different from the efficiency of the incumbents. We find that the profit-sharing rule that firms adopt to divide the cartel profit after entry is a key determinant of the incentives for collusion (before and after entry). In particular, if the incumbents and the entrant are very asymmetric, collusion without side- payments cannot be sustained. However, if firms divide joint profits through bargaining and are sufficiently patient, collusion is sustainable even if firms are very asymmetric.

Suggested Citation

  • António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Asymmetric collusion with growing demand," FEP Working Papers 510, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    • Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:510
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    Cited by:

    1. João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2016. "Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(1), pages 1-34, May.
    2. Leonardo Madio & Aldo Pignataro, 2022. "Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0295, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    3. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2020. "Combining cartel penalties and private damage actions: The impact on cartel prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Leonardo Madio & Aldo Pignataro, 2022. "Collusion Sustainability with a Capacity Constrained Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series 10170, CESifo.
    5. Hattori, Keisuke, 2021. "Profit-Sharing vs Price-Fixing Collusion with Heterogeneous Firms," MPRA Paper 110800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Correia-da-Silva João & Pinho Joana & Vasconcelos Hélder, 2015. "How Should Cartels React to Entry Triggered by Demand Growth?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-47, January.
    7. Jen-Yao Lee & Chen-Chia Fan & Chien-Shu Tsai, 2023. "Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-11, March.
    8. João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2014. "Sustaining collusion in markets with a general evolution of demand," FEP Working Papers 537, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collusion; Growing demand; Nash bargaining; Profit-sharing.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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