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The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition

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  • Bernard Salanié

    ()
    (Columbia University)

Abstract

The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5.

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Bibliographic Info

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This book is provided by The MIT Press in its series MIT Press Books with number 0262195259 and published in 2005.

Volume: 1
Edition: 1
ISBN: 0-262-19525-9
Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262195259

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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu

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Cited by:
  1. Florin O. Bilbie & David Stasavage, 2005. "Incomplete Fiscal Rules with Imperfect Enforcement," Economics Series Working Papers 2005-W12, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Grant Miller & Kimberly Singer Babiarz, 2013. "Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs," NBER Working Papers 18932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Schmidt, Robert & Pollrich, Martin & Stiel, Caroline, 2013. "An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79741, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  4. David Fernando Tobon Orozco & Germán Darío Valencia & Danny García Callejas & Guillermo Perez, 2004. "Institucionalidad e incentivos en la educación básica y media en Colombia," BORRADORES DEL CIE 002880, UNIVERSIDAD DE ANTIOQUIA - CIE.
  5. Plehn-Dujowich, Jose M., 2009. "Endogenous growth and adverse selection in entrepreneurship," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 1419-1436, July.
  6. Anja Schöttner & Veikko Thiele, 2010. "Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 699-731, 09.

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