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Cournot Oligopoly Conditions under which Any Horizontal Merger Is Profitable

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Author Info
David Hennessy

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1007804129800
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 277-284
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Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:277-284

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Related research
Keywords: Demand function; endogenous merger; equilibrium; market power;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kamien, Morton I. & Zang, Israel, 1991. "Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 323-338, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Kamien, Morton I & Zang, Israel, 1990. "The Limits of Monopolization through Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 465-99, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Mantovani, 2006. "Horizontal Mergers with Scale Economies," Working Papers 571, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marina Tsygankova, 2007. "When is Mighty Gazprom Good for Russia?," Discussion Papers 526, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
  3. Berardino Cesi, 2006. "Profitability of Horizontal Mergers in Trigger Strategy Game," Discussion Papers in Economics 06/4, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Tina Kao & Flavio Menezes, 2009. "Welfare Enhancing Mergers Under Product Differentiation," ANUCBE School of Economics Working Papers 2009-508, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2003. "Capital Accumulation and Horizontal Mergers in Differential Oligopoly Games," Working Papers 477, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  6. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Mantovani, 2007. "Antitrust Guidelines: A Simple Operational Method for Evaluating Horizontal Mergers," Working Papers 591, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  7. Oliver Budzinski & Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer, 2009. "Implications of Unprofitable Horizontal Mergers: A Positive External Effect does not Suffice to Clear a Merger!," Working Papers 84/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-22.

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