Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Policy Divergence in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting

Contents:

Author Info

  • Adams, James
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence, yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies. What accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation? I introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence: 1) a model which incorporates candidate-specific variables, so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy-related electoral advantages (or disadvantages); 2) a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters' candidate utilities, thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds. I report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model, which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model. I then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 100 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
    Pages: 103-22

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:100:y:1999:i:1-2:p:103-22

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2013. "Equilibrium in a discrete Downsian model given a non-minimal valence advantage and linear loss functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 150-153.
    2. L. Lambertini, 2001. "Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign," Working Papers 415, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    3. Felix Bierbrauer & Pierre C. Boyer, 2010. "Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_45, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    4. L. Lambertini, 2007. "Platform Stickiness in a Spatial Voting Model," Working Papers 597, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    5. Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Voting to anger and to please others," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 247-254, March.
    6. Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate," Economics Working Papers 502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:40:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Dimitrios Xefteris, 2014. "Mixed equilibriums in a three-candidate spatial model with candidate valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 101-120, January.
    9. Norman Schofield & Ugur Ozdemir, 2009. "Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 207-242, October.
    10. Hummel, Patrick, 2010. "On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 425-445, November.
    11. Enriqueta Aragonés & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2011. "Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space," Working Papers 529, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    12. Norman Schofield, 2007. "Modelling Politics," ICER Working Papers 33-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    13. James Adams & Samuel Merrill, 2013. "Policy-seeking candidates who value the valence attributes of the winner," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 139-161, April.
    14. Zakharov, Alexei & Fantazzini, Dean, 2009. "Economic Factors in a Model of Voting: The Case of The Netherlands, Great Britain, and Israel," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 14(2), pages 57-73.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:100:y:1999:i:1-2:p:103-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.