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Abstract

This paper calculates a time series of simple, standard measures of schools’ relative performance. These are drawn from a 1997-2004 panel of Chilean schools, using individual-level information on test scores and student characteristics for each year. The results suggest there is a stark tradeoff in the extent to which rankings generated using these measures: i) can be shown to be very similar to rankings based purely on students’ socioeconomic status, and ii) are very volatile from year to year. At least in Chile, therefore, producing a meaningful ranking of schools that may inform parents and policymakers may be harder than is commonly assumed.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 84 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 61-75

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:84:y:2007:i:1:p:61-75

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

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References

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1. Abhijit Banerjee & Angus Deaton & Esther Duflo, 2003. "Wealth, health, and health services in rural Rajasthan," Working Papers 253, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center for Health and Wellbeing..
   
   • Abhijit Banerjee & Angus Deaton & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Wealth, Health, and Health Services in Rural Rajasthan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 326-330, May.
   • Abhijit Banerjee & Angus Deaton & Esther Duflo, 2003. "Wealth, health, and health services in rural Rajasthan," Working Papers 175, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies..
   • Abhijit Banerjee & Angus Deaton & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Wealth, health, and health services in rural rajasthan," Framed Field Experiments 00121, The Field Experiments Website.
2. Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, 2001. "Disruption versus Tiebout Improvement: The Costs and Benefits of Switching Schools," NBER Working Papers 8479, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   
   • Hanushek, Eric A. & Kain, John F. & Rivkin, Steven G., 2004. "Disruption versus Tiebout improvement: the costs and benefits of switching schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1721-1746, August.
3. Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2004. "The power of information : evidence from a newspaper campaign to reduce capture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3239, The World Bank.
4. Hsieh, Chang-Tai & Urquiola, Miguel, 2006. "The effects of generalized school choice on achievement and stratification: Evidence from Chile's voucher program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1477-1503, September.
5. Duflo, Esther & Hanna, Rema & Ryan, Stephen, 2008. "Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School," CEPR Discussion Papers 6682, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   
   • Esther Duflo & Rema Hanna, 2005. "Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School," NBER Working Papers 11880, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Duflo, Esther & Hanna, Rema, 2005. "Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School," CEPR Discussion Papers 5426, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Esther Duflo & Rema Hanna, 2005. "Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School," Working Papers id:301, eSocialSciences.
6. Nazmul Chaudhury & Jeffrey Hammer & Michael Kremer & Karthik Muralidharan & F. Halsey Rogers, 2006. "Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 91-116, Winter.
7. Abhijit Banerjee & Esther Duflo, 2006. "Addressing Absence," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 117-132, Winter.
8. Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, 2002. "The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School Accountability Measures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 91-114, Fall.
9. Eric Hanushek, 2004. "United States lessons about school accountability," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 2(4), pages 27-32, 01.
10. Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2004. "Local Capture: Evidence From a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 678-704, May.
11. Paul Glewwe & Nauman Ilias & Micheal Kremer, 2003. "Teacher incentives," Natural Field Experiments 00257, The Field Experiments Website.
    
    • Paul Glewwe & Nauman Ilias & Michael Kremer, 2010. "Teacher Incentives," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 205-27, July.
    • Paul Glewwe & Nauman Ilias & Michael Kremer, 2003. "Teacher Incentives," NBER Working Papers 9671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
12. Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2003. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions that Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," NBER Working Papers 10118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    
    • Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2005. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions That Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1237-1258, September.
    • Kenneth Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2003. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions that Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," Discussion Papers 0304-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
13. Victor Lavy, 2002. "Evaluating the Effect of Teachers' Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1286-1317, December.
14. Lant Pritchett, 2004. "Towards a New Consensus for Addressing the Global Challenge of the Lack of Education," Working Papers 43, Center for Global Development.
15. Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera, 2002. "Evaluación del Desempeño e Incentivos en la Educación Chilena," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 39(118), pages 353-394.
16. repec:feb:natura:0017 is not listed on IDEAS
17. Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, 2001. "Improving School Accountability Measures," NBER Working Papers 8156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
18. Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera, 2000. "School Performance and Choice: The Chilean Experience," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 35(2), pages 392-417.

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Citations

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Cited by:

1. Raymundo M. Campos-Vázquez & Freddy Damián Romero Urbina, 2010. "Desempeño educativo en México: la prueba ENLACE," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2010-19, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
   
   • Raymundo M. Campos Vázquez & Freddy D. Urbina Romero, 2011. "Desempeño educativo en México: la prueba Enlace," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 26(2), pages 249-292.
2. MacLeod, Bentley, 2009. "Anti-Lemons: School Reputation and Educational Quality," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3rc708kd, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
   
   • W. Bentley MacLeod & Miguel Urquiola, 2009. "Anti-Lemons: School Reputation and Educational Quality," NBER Working Papers 15112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
3. Alejandra Mizala & Miguel Urquiola, 2007. "School Markets: The Impact of Information Approximating Schools' Effectiveness," NBER Working Papers 13676, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
4. Alejandra Mizala & Miguel Urquiola, 2007. "Parental choice and school markets: The impact of information approximating school effectiveness," Documentos de Trabajo 239, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
5. MacLeod, W. Bentley & Urquiola, Miguel, 2012. "Competition and Educational Productivity: Incentives Writ Large," IZA Discussion Papers 7063, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
6. Fack, Gabrielle & Grenet, Julien, 2010. "When do better schools raise housing prices? Evidence from Paris public and private schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 59-77, February.
   
   • Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet, 2010. "When do Better Schools Raise Housing Prices? Evidence from Paris Public and Private Schools," CEE Discussion Papers 0119, Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE.
7. Bernardo Lara & Alejandra Mizala & Andrea Repetto, 2009. "The Effectiveness of Private Voucher Education: Evidence from Structural School Switches," Documentos de Trabajo 263, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
   
   • Andrea Repetto & Alejandra Mizala & Bernardo Lara, 2010. "The Effectiveness of Private Voucher Education: Evidence from Structural School Switches," 2010 Meeting Papers 104, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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