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Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance

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Author Info

  • Camargo, Braz

    ()
    (Sao Paulo School of Economics)

  • Camelo, Rafael

    ()
    (Sao Paulo School of Economics)

  • Firpo, Sergio

    ()
    (Sao Paulo School of Economics)

  • Ponczek, Vladimir

    ()
    (Sao Paulo School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper uses a discontinuity on the test score disclosure rules of the National Secondary Education Examination in Brazil to test whether test score disclosure affects student performance, the composition of students in schools, and school observable inputs. We find that test score disclosure has a heterogeneous impact on test scores, but only increases average test scores in private schools. Since test score disclosure has no impact on student composition and school observable inputs in both public and private schools, our results suggest that test score disclosure changes the behavior of teachers and school managers in private schools by affecting the market incentives faced by such schools. We also develop a model of school and student behavior to help explain our empirical findings.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 7941.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7941

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Related research

Keywords: test score disclosure; market incentives; public and private schools;

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References

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  1. Pierre Koning & Karen van der Wiel, 2013. "Ranking The Schools: How School-Quality Information Affects School Choice In The Netherlands," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 466-493, 04.
  2. Figlio, David N. & Kenny, Lawrence W., 2009. "Public sector performance measurement and stakeholder support," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1069-1077, October.
  3. Hahn, Jinyong & Todd, Petra & Van der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2001. "Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 201-09, January.
  4. Pierre Koning & Karen Wiel, 2012. "School Responsiveness to Quality Rankings: An Empirical Analysis of Secondary Education in the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 160(4), pages 339-355, December.
  5. Fack, Gabrielle & Grenet, Julien, 2010. "When do better schools raise housing prices? Evidence from Paris public and private schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 59-77, February.
  6. Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera & Miguel Urquiola, 2006. "Socioeconomic status or noise? Tradeoffs in the generation of school quality information," Documentos de Trabajo 225, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  7. Justine S. Hastings & Jeffrey M. Weinstein, 2008. "Information, School Choice, and Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(4), pages 1373-1414, November.
  8. Jonah Rockoff & Lesley J. Turner, 2010. "Short-Run Impacts of Accountability on School Quality," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 119-47, November.
  9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, 2004. "Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student Performance?," NBER Working Papers 10591, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. David N. Figlio & Maurice E. Lucas, 2004. "What's in a Grade? School Report Cards and the Housing Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 591-604, June.
  12. David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 2009. "Regression Discontinuity Designs In Economics," Working Papers 1118, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  13. Karthik Muralidharan & Venkatesh Sundararaman, 2011. "Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 39 - 77.
  14. Sandra E. Black, 1999. "Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation Of Elementary Education," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 577-599, May.
  15. Podgursky, Michael & Springer, Matthew, 2011. "Teacher Compensation Systems In The United States K-12 Public School System," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 64(1), pages 165-92, March.
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