Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Incentives and responses under No Child Left Behind: Credible threats and the role of competition

Contents:

Author Info

  • Chakrabarti, Rajashri

Abstract

NCLB mandated the institution of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) objectives, and schools are assigned an AYP pass/fail based on performance in these objectives. AYP-fail status is associated with negative publicity and often sanctions. Using data from Wisconsin and alternate regression discontinuity designs, I study the incentives and responses of schools that failed AYP once. Math-induced AYP-failures showed strong improvements in math, while reading-induced AYP-failures showed marked improvements in reading. Consistent with incentives, these schools showed no positive effect in other high stakes objectives. In contrast, test-participation failures showed no effect in either high stakes reading or math, while they showed some evidence of positive (though not statistically significant) effects in test participation. Improvements in reading are associated with parallel effects in low stakes language arts (possibly due to spillover effects), while there is no evidence of effects in low stakes science or social studies. Nor is there evidence of effects on graduation rates. Performance in low stakes grades suffered, and so did performance in weaker subgroups in spite of their inclusion in AYP computations. There is evidence of focus on marginal students around high stakes cutoffs in subject areas AYP-failed schools improved in, but this did not come at the expense of ends. Credibility of threat mattered—AYP-failed schools that faced more competition responded considerably more strongly in the objectives they had incentives in.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272713001643
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 110 (2014)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 124-146

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:110:y:2014:i:c:p:124-146

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

Related research

Keywords: No Child Left Behind; Incentives; Public school performance; Regression discontinuity;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Marigee Bacolod & John DiNardo & Mireille Jacobson, 2009. "Beyond Incentives: Do Schools use Accountability Rewards Productively?," NBER Working Papers 14775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Thomas S. Dee & Brian Jacob, 2011. "The impact of no Child Left Behind on student achievement," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 418-446, 06.
  3. Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, 2006. "The Efficacy of Choice Threats Within School Accountability Systems: Results from Legislatively Induced Experiments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(510), pages C46-C62, 03.
  4. David N. Figlio & Joshua Winicki, 2002. "Food for Thought: The Effects of School Accountability Plans on School Nutrition," NBER Working Papers 9319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Randall Reback, 2006. "Teaching to the Rating: School Accountability and the Distribution of Student Achievement," Working Papers 0602, Barnard College, Department of Economics.
  6. John M. Krieg, 2008. "Are Students Left Behind? The Distributional Effects of the No Child Left Behind Act," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 3(2), pages 250-281, April.
  7. Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation Of The Prevalence And Predictors Of Teacher Cheating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 843-877, August.
  8. Julie Berry Cullen & Randall Reback, 2006. "Tinkering Toward Accolades: School Gaming Under a Performance Accountability System," NBER Working Papers 12286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Randall Reback & Jonah Rockoff & Heather L. Schwartz, 2011. "Under Pressure: Job Security, Resource Allocation, and Productivity in Schools Under NCLB," NBER Working Papers 16745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Rajashri Chakrabarti, 2008. "Impact of voucher design on public school performance: evidence from Florida and Milwaukee voucher programs," Staff Reports 315, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  11. Rajashri Chakrabarti, 2007. "Vouchers, public school response, and the role of incentives: evidence from Florida," Staff Reports 306, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  12. Rajashri Chakrabarti, 2005. "Can Increasing Private School Participation and Monetary Loss in a Voucher Program Affect Public School Performance? Evidence from Milwaukee," Public Economics 0512003, EconWPA.
  13. Figlio, David N. & Rouse, Cecilia Elena, 2006. "Do accountability and voucher threats improve low-performing schools?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 239-255, January.
  14. Rajashri Chakrabarti, 2013. "Accountability with Voucher Threats, Responses, and the Test-Taking Population: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Florida," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 8(2), pages 121-167, April.
  15. Jonah Rockoff & Lesley J. Turner, 2010. "Short-Run Impacts of Accountability on School Quality," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 119-47, November.
  16. Derek Neal & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010. "Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 263-283, May.
  17. Caroline Minter Hoxby, 2003. "School Choice and School Productivity. Could School Choice Be a Tide that Lifts All Boats?," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of School Choice, pages 287-342 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. McCrary, Justin, 2008. "Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 698-714, February.
  19. Alan I. Barreca & Jason M. Lindo & Glen R. Waddell, 2011. "Heaping-Induced Bias in Regression-Discontinuity Designs," NBER Working Papers 17408, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. David N. Figlio, 2005. "Testing, Crime and Punishment," NBER Working Papers 11194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Hahn, Jinyong & Todd, Petra & Van der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2001. "Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 201-09, January.
  22. Chiang, Hanley, 2009. "How accountability pressure on failing schools affects student achievement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1045-1057, October.
  23. Springer, Matthew G., 2008. "The influence of an NCLB accountability plan on the distribution of student test score gains," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 556-563, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:110:y:2014:i:c:p:124-146. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.