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Can failure succeed? Using racial subgroup rules to analyze the effect of school accountability failure on student performance

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  • Sims, David P.

Abstract

Many school accountability programs are built on the premise that the sanctions attached to failure will produce higher future student achievement. Furthermore, such programs often include subgroup achievement rules that attempt to hold schools accountable for the performance of all demographic classes of students. This paper looks at two issues: the degree to which such rules increase the likelihood of school failure, and the effect of failure to meet a performance standard on subsequent student achievement. Using data from California's state accountability program, I find that subgroup rules lead to otherwise similar schools having different probabilities of failure. I also find that subgroup induced failure leads to lower future student achievement under both the state's system and its’ implementation of No Child Left Behind. This implies that small demographic differences play a large role in how schools are judged and how they perform under current accountability systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Sims, David P., 2013. "Can failure succeed? Using racial subgroup rules to analyze the effect of school accountability failure on student performance," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 262-274.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:262-274
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.12.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Tavares, Priscilla Albuquerque, 2015. "The impact of school management practices on educational performance: Evidence from public schools in São Paulo," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-15.
    2. Alexander Bogin & Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, 2014. "Property Left Behind: An Unintended Consequence Of A No Child Left Behind “Failing” School Designation," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(5), pages 788-805, November.
    3. Matthew Shirrell, 2018. "The Effects of Subgroup-Specific Accountability on Teacher Turnover and Attrition," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 13(3), pages 333-368, Summer.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    No Child Left Behind; Stigma; School accountability; Student achievement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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