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Citations for "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions"

by Leonid Hurwicz

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  1. Haake, Claus-Jochen & Trockel, Walter, 2011. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 393, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  2. John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996. "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 163-192, December.
  3. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 259-279, September.
  4. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  5. Amoros, Pablo, 2004. "Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November.
  6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
  7. Mirowski, Philip, 2007. "Markets come to bits: Evolution, computation and markomata in economic science," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 209-242, June.
  8. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 322, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  9. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2007. "L'Analyse Economique des Normes Sociales: una Réévaluation de l'Héritage Hayékien," ICER Working Papers 45-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  10. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 3-19, June.
  12. Trockel,W., 1999. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 305, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  13. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  14. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00346389 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
  16. Andreas Pfingsten & Andreas Wagener, 1997. "Centralized vs. Decentralized Redistribution: A Case for Interregional Transfer Mechanisms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 429-451, November.
  17. Buzard, Kristy & Watson, Joel, 2010. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3df3q4vg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  18. Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2009. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: General Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3923q7kz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  19. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 227-242, February.
  20. Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November.
  21. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Efficient institutions," Working Papers 08-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  22. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
  23. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2014. "Efficient contract enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(1), pages 161-183, January.
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