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Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Mirowski, Philip, 2007. "Markets come to bits: Evolution, computation and markomata in economic science," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 209-242, June.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-25.
  3. John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996. "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 163-192.
  4. Andreas Pfingsten & Andreas Wagener, 1997. "Centralized vs. Decentralized Redistribution: A Case for Interregional Transfer Mechanisms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 4(4), pages 429-451, November.
  5. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  6. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 543-566.
  7. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2008. "L’analyse économique des normes sociales : une réévaluation de l’héritage hayékien," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 22(4), pages 103-137.
  8. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 655-708.
  9. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 322, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  10. repec:spr:grdene:v:23:y:2014:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-013-9342-x is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 3-19.
  12. Amoros, Pablo, 2004. "Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 424-434.
  13. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(3), pages 259-279, September.
  14. Raul V. Fabella, 2013. "Moral Hazard and Cooperation in Competing Teams," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201308, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
  15. Trockel,W., 1999. "On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 306, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  16. Trockel,W., 1999. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 305, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  17. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 227-242, February.
  18. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2010. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 17-25.
  19. Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  20. John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996. "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 163-192.
  21. Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  22. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
  23. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00346389 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Raul V. Fabella, 2013. "Salience and Cooperation Among Rational Egoists," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201309, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
  25. repec:jmi:articl:jmi-v1i1a3 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Michael Sproul, 1998. "Backed Money, Fiat Money, and the Real Bills Doctrine," UCLA Economics Working Papers 774B, UCLA Department of Economics.
  27. repec:spr:grdene:v:18:y:2009:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-008-9146-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Duman, Papatya & Trockel, Walter, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash Solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein’s game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 550, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  29. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Efficient institutions," Working Papers 08-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  30. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2014. "Efficient contract enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 161-183.
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