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Citations for "Incomplete Contracts and Signalling"

by Kathryn E. Spier

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  1. Ying-Ju Chen & Xiaojian Zhao, 2013. "Solution Concepts of Principal-Agent Models with Unawareness of Actions," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 508, August.
  2. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2014. "Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 14/325, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  3. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4677, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Xiaotong Li, 2005. "Cheap Talk and Bogus Network Externalities in the Emerging Technology Market," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(4), pages 531-543, October.
  5. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19316, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Ernst-Ludwig Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2014. "Multi-task agency with unawareness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 197-222, August.
  7. Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver, 2014. "The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 135-146.
  8. Steven Shavell, 2003. "On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts," NBER Working Papers 10094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Dessi, Roberta, 2009. "Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital," TSE Working Papers 09-075, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  10. Schuett, Florian, 2007. "Field-of-use restrictions in licensing agreements," MPRA Paper 8534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Stefano Comino & Antonio Nicolò & Piero Tedeschi, 2006. "Termination Clauses in Partnerships," Working Papers 20060505, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica.
  12. David Martimort & Salvatore Piccolo, 2010. "The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 204-29, February.
  13. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
  14. Hyytinen, Ari & Steen, Frode & Toivanen, Otto, 2013. "Anatomy of Cartel Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 9362, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Eric Rasmusen & ., 1995. "A Model of Negotiation, Not Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 9506001, EconWPA, revised 14 Jun 1995.
  16. Vasconcelos, Luís, 2014. "Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 19-33.
  17. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Contract Law," NBER Working Papers 9696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
  19. Richard Franza & Kevin Grant & W. Spivey, 2012. "Technology transfer contracts between R&D labs and commercial partners: choose your words wisely," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 577-587, August.
  20. Alexander Stremitzer, 2010. "If you Give Shareholders Power, do they Use it?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(1), pages 58-61, March.
  21. Jean Beuve & Claudine Desrieux, 2016. "Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 125-158, January.
  22. Kwanghui Lim & Brian Cu, 2012. "The effects of social networks and contractual characteristics on the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 573-596, September.
  23. Wernerfelt, Birger, 2003. "Indirect Adjustment-Costs Under Alternative Coordination Regimes," Working papers 4336-01, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  24. repec:esx:essedp:572 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2013. "Intention-based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 55-65.
  26. Marina Halac, 2012. "Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 750-79, April.
  27. Bottazzi, L. & Da Rin, M. & Hellmann, T., 2010. "The Importance of Trust for Investment : Evidence From Venture Capital (Revision of DP 2009-43)," Discussion Paper 2010-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  28. Isabel Marcin & Andreas Nicklisch, 2014. "Testing the Endowment Effect for Default Rules," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  29. Eric Rasmusen & ., 1995. "``The Economics of Agency Law and Contract Formation''," Law and Economics 9506002, EconWPA.
  30. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William S., 2013. "Endogenous coordination and discoordination games: Multiculturalism and assimilation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 176-191.
  31. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Oliver D. Hart, 2013. "More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 19001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.