Bad Reputation

Citations

Cited by:

1. Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, 2013. "Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 369-397.
2. Johannes Hörner & Stefano Lovo, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 453-487, March.
   • LOVO, Stefano & HÖRNER, Johanes, 2006. "Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information," HEC Research Papers Series 845, HEC Paris.
   • Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," HEC Research Papers Series 884, HEC Paris.
   • Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Working Papers hal-00580152, HAL.
   • Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Post-Print hal-00459955, HAL.
3. Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2013. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust, and Conflict," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(3), pages 1114-1147.
   • Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2010. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," OxCarre Working Papers 058, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
   • Rohner, D. & Thoenig, M. & Zilibotti, F., 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1136, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
   • Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2011. "War signals: a theory of trade, trust and conflict," ECON - Working Papers 013, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
   • Mathias Thoenig & Fabrizio Zilibotti & Dominic Rohner, 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," 2011 Meeting Papers 281, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • Zilibotti, Fabrizio & Rohner, Dominic, 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," CEPR Discussion Papers 8352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig & Fabrizio Zilibottix, 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," HiCN Working Papers 95, Households in Conflict Network.
4. Harasser, Andreas, 2014. "Information asymmetry and reentry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 118-121.
5. Alessandro Acquisti, 2014. "Inducing Customers to Try New Goods," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(2), pages 131-146, March.
6. Kawai, Keiichi, 2015. "Reputation for quality and adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 47-59.
7. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
   • Sturm, Daniel & Smart, Michael, 2004. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46860, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   • Michael Smart & Daniel M. Sturm, 2006. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEP Discussion Papers dp0770, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
   • Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2006. "Term limits and electoral accountability," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19771, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   • Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel, 2004. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Economic History Working Papers 20283, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
8. Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
   • Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "When is reputation bad?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 10, pages 177-205, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
   • Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine.
   • Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008. "When is Reputation Bad?," Scholarly Articles 3196337, Harvard University Department of Economics.
   • Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
9. Junghun Cho, 2008. "Sequential Cheap Talk from Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp352, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
10. Bar-Isaac Heski, 2012. "Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-15, January.
11. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
    • Andrea Prat, 2002. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 439, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    • Prat, Andrea, 2004. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24712, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Prat, Andrea, 2002. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3679, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
12. Robert Gazzale, 2005. "Giving Gossips Their Due: Information Provision in Games with Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 0508002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
13. Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2017. "Uncertain information structures and backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 135-151.
    • Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2014. "Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction," IKERLANAK 12097, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
14. Jesper Rudiger & Adrien Vigier, 2015. "Pundits and Quacks," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1997, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
15. Robert Gazzale & Tapan Khopkar, 2011. "Remain silent and ye shall suffer: seller exploitation of reticent buyers in an experimental reputation system," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(2), pages 273-285, May.
    • Robert S. Gazzale & Tapan Khopkar, 2008. "Remain Silent and Ye Shall Suffer: Seller Exploitation of Reticent Buyers in an Experimental Reputation System," Department of Economics Working Papers 2008-22, Department of Economics, Williams College.
16. Antonelli, Cristiano, 2017. "From the Economics of Information to the Economics of Knowledge," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis LEI & BRICK - Laboratory of Economics of Innovation "Franco Momigliano", Bureau of Research in Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge, Collegio 201706, University of Turin.
17. Chen, Yong & Mak, Barry & Li, Zhou, 2013. "Quality deterioration in package tours: The interplay of asymmetric information and reputation," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 43-54.
18. Zhaohui Chen & Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm Jr., 2014. "Investment Bank Reputation and “Star” Cultures," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 2(2), pages 129-153.
19. W. Bentley MacLeod & Teck Yong Tan, 2016. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile," NBER Working Papers 22156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
20. Kyna Fong, "undated". "Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons," Discussion Papers 07-043, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
21. Winand Emons, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 605-620, December.
    • Winand Emons, 2010. "Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," Diskussionsschriften dp1001, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    • Emons, Winand, 2010. "Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 7659, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
22. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
23. Oliver Gürtler, 2008. "Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 177-189, July.
24. Shapiro, Jesse M., 2016. "Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 91-108.
    • Jesse M. Shapiro, 2014. "Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 19807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
25. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 1730, CESifo.
    • MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
26. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
    • Christoph Schottmüller, 2016. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Discussion Papers 16-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
27. Dasgupta, Amil & Sarafidis, Yianis, 2009. "Managers as administrators: Reputation and incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 155-163, May.
28. Englmaier, Florian & Filipi, Ales & Singh, Ravi, 2010. "Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 413-427, November.
    • Florian Englmaier & Ales Filipi & Ravi Singh, 2010. "Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority," CESifo Working Paper Series 2979, CESifo.
    • Florian Englmaier & Ales Filipi & Ravi Singh, 2010. "Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority," Post-Print hal-00870189, HAL.
    • Englmaier, Florian & Filipi, Ales & Singh, Ravi, 2010. "Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority," Munich Reprints in Economics 22012, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Englmaier, Florian & Filipi, Ales & Singh, Ravi, 2010. "Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 327, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
29. Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2009. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000330, David K. Levine.
    • Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2011. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 11/272, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
30. Alma Cohen & Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, 2015. "Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S1), pages 133-159.
31. Dominik Erharter, 2012. "Credence goods markets, distributional preferences and the role of institutions," Working Papers 2012-11, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
32. Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2015. "Careerist experts and political incorrectness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-18.
    • Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2014. "Careerist Experts and Political Incorrectness," ISER Discussion Paper 0894, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
33. Alexander Frankel & Michael Schwarz, 2014. "Experts And Their Records," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 56-71, January.
34. Sedlacek, Sabine & Maier, Gunther, 2012. "Can green building councils serve as third party governance institutions? An economic and institutional analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 479-487.
35. Alexander Frankel & Michael Schwarz, 2009. "Experts and Their Records," NBER Working Papers 14921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
36. Antonelli, Cristiano, 2017. "From the Economics of Information to the Economics of Knowledge. Length: pages 39," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201714, University of Turin.
37. Chee Leong, 2012. "A Dynamic Game of Reputation and Economic Performances in Nondemocratic Regimes," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 385-400, December.
38. Lan Shi & Christina Tapia, 2009. "The Disciplining Effect of Concern for Referrals for Better Informed Agents: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions," Working Papers UWEC-2009-06, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
39. Pavesi, Filippo & Scotti, Massimo, 2022. "Good lies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    • Filippo Pavesi & Massimo Scotti, 2019. "Good Lies," Working Paper Series 39, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
40. Mariana Lopes da Fonseca, 2016. "Candid Lame Ducks," CESifo Working Paper Series 5773, CESifo.
41. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Reputations in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-034, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
42. Sedlacek, Sabine & Maier, Gunther, 2012. "Green Building Councils: Their Economic Role as Governance Institutions," SRE-Discussion Papers 2012/02, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    • Sabine Sedlacek & Gunther Maier, 2012. "Green Building Councils: Their Economic Role as Governance Institutions," SRE-Disc sre-disc-2012_02, Institute for Multilevel Governance and Development, Department of Socioeconomics, Vienna University of Economics and Business.
43. Kunio Tsuyuhara, 2012. "An advice game with reputational and career concerns," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3480-3487.
44. Iconio Garrì, 2008. "Politician's Reputation and Policy (Un)persistence," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0851, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
45. Wrasai, Phongthorn & Swank, Otto H., 2007. "Policy makers, advisers, and reputation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 579-590, April.
    • Phongthorn Wrasai & Otto H. Swank, 2004. "Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 09 Dec 2004.
46. Pierre-Yves Yanni, 2012. "Coarse Information and Entrepreneurial Risk Choice," 2012 Meeting Papers 1142, Society for Economic Dynamics.
47. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
48. Klein, Nicolas & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2017. "Will truth out?—An advisor’s quest to appear competent," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 112-121.
49. Hidir, Sinem, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Credibility in Cheap Talk," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 36, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
50. Junghun Cho, 2006. "Multiple Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp314, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.