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A Two-Person Game of Information Transmission

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  2. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December.
  3. Chen, Ying, 2012. "Value of public information in sender–receiver games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 343-345.
  4. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
  5. Eyal Sulganik & Itzhak Zilcha, 1994. "The Value of Information: Disadvantageous Risk-Sharing Markets," Microeconomics 9405001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 May 1994.
  6. Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
  7. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
  8. Edoardo Grillo, 2014. "Reference Dependence and Politicians' Credibility," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 353, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  9. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  10. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001. "A Model of Expertise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775.
  11. Giovanni Immordino, 2005. "Uncertainty and the Cost of Reversal," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(2), pages 119-128, December.
  12. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
  13. Bing Jing, 2011. "Seller honesty and product line pricing," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 403-427, December.
  14. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247.
  15. Gayer Gabrielle & Segev Ella, 2012. "Revealing Private Information in Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-34, December.
  16. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
  17. Gaynor, Martin, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 211-255, Spring.
  18. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5279 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Mitropoulos, Atanasios, 2003. "An experiment on the value of structural information in a 2 x 2 repeated game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 27-32, January.
  20. Maxim Ivanov, 2016. "Dynamic learning and strategic communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 627-653, August.
  21. Vladimir Karamychev & Bauke Visser, 2011. "An Optimal Signaling Equilibrium," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-148/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  22. Sulganik, Eyal, 1995. "On the structure of Blackwell's equivalence classes of information systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 213-223, June.
  23. Philippe Jehiel, 2019. "Communication with Forgetful Liars," PSE Working Papers halshs-02183313, HAL.
  24. Yun Wang, 2015. "Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers," Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  25. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
  26. Marschak, Thomas & Shanthikumar, J. George & Zhou, Junjie, 2017. "Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 104-117.
  27. Charness, Gary B & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2008. "Broken Promises: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6836m74q, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  28. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
  29. Edoardo Grillo, 2013. "Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 331, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  30. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
  31. Ui, Takashi & Yoshizawa, Yasunori, 2015. "Characterizing social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 507-535.
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