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The Science Game: An Experiment on Reducing errors in Forensic Science and Other Areas

  • Roger G. Koppl

In "monopoly epistemics", one privileged actor is asked to identify the truth. In "democratic epistemics", several independent parties are asked. In an experiment contrasting them, democratic epistemics reduced the systemic error rate by two-thirds, supporting the claim that replacing monopoly epistemics with democratic epistemics would reduce error rates in forensic science and other areas. It also suggests first, the potential of "epistemic systems design", which employs the techniques of economic systems design to address issues of veracity, rather than efficiency, and second, the value of "experimental epistemology", which employs experimental techniques in the study of science. Research of the sort described here puts evolutionary epistemology into practice by seeking to find the proper design principles for error-correcting social institutions. Length 52 pages

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File URL: ftp://137.248.191.199/RePEc/esi/discussionpapers/2006-09.pdf
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Paper provided by Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2006-09.

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Date of creation: Jul 2006
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Handle: RePEc:esi:evopap:2006-09
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  1. Smith, Vernon L, 1976. "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 274-79, May.
  2. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  3. Joseph Henrich & Robert Boyd & Samuel Bowles & Colin Camerer & Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis & Richard McElreath & Michael Alvard & Abigail Barr & Jean Ensminger & Kim Hill & Francisco Gil-White & Micha, 2001. "Economic Man in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in Fifteen Small-Scale Societies," Working Papers 01-11-063, Santa Fe Institute.
  4. Langlois, Richard N., 2002. "Modularity in technology and organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 19-37, September.
  5. Blume, Andreas, et al, 1998. "Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1323-40, December.
  6. Roger Koppl, 2005. "How to Improve Forensic Science," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 255-286, November.
  7. Roger Koppl & Richard Langlois, 2001. "Organizations and Language Games," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 287-305, September.
  8. Vernon L. Smith, 2003. "Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 465-508, June.
  9. Roger Koppl, 2005. "Diversity and Forensics: Diversity in Hiring is Not Enough," Labor and Demography 0510003, EconWPA.
  10. Bacharach, Michael & Bernasconi, Michele, 1997. "The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-45, April.
  11. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
  12. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June.
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