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Citations for "Bad Reputation"

by Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki

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  1. Rohner, Dominic & Thoenig, Mathias & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," CEPR Discussion Papers 8352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. repec:dgr:uvatin:20040037 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Dasgupta, Amil & Sarafidis, Yianis, 2009. "Managers as administrators: Reputation and incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 155-163, May.
  4. Oliver Gürtler, 2008. "Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 177-189, July.
  5. Winand Emons, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 605-620, December.
  6. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  7. Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2011. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 11/272, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  8. Michael Smart & Daniel Sturm, 2004. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Economic History Working Papers 20283, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  9. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
  10. Sabine Sedlacek & Gunther Maier, 2012. "Green Building Councils: Their Economic Role as Governance Institutions," SRE-Disc sre-disc-2012_02, Institute for Multilevel Governance and Development, Department of Socioeconomics, Vienna University of Economics and Business.
  11. Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2014. "Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2014-79, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  12. George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  13. Kunio Tsuyuhara, 2012. "An advice game with reputational and career concerns," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3480-3487.
  14. Robert Gazzale & Tapan Khopkar, 2011. "Remain silent and ye shall suffer: seller exploitation of reticent buyers in an experimental reputation system," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 273-285, May.
  15. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA.
  16. Chee Leong, 2012. "A Dynamic Game of Reputation and Economic Performances in Nondemocratic Regimes," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 385-400, December.
  17. Jullien, Bruno & Park, In-Uck, 2009. "New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility," TSE Working Papers 09-086, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised 29 Jan 2014.
  18. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 1730, CESifo Group Munich.
  19. repec:dgr:uvatin:2004037 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Junghun Cho, 2008. "Sequential Cheap Talk from Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp352, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  21. Pierre-Yves Yanni, 2012. "Coarse Information and Entrepreneurial Risk Choice," 2012 Meeting Papers 1142, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  22. Wrasai, Phongthorn & Swank, Otto H., 2007. "Policy makers, advisers, and reputation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 579-590, April.
  23. Dominik Erharter, 2012. "Credence goods markets, distributional preferences and the role of institutions," Working Papers 2012-11, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  24. Harasser, Andreas, 2014. "Information asymmetry and reentry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 118-121.
  25. Robert Gazzale, 2005. "Giving Gossips Their Due: Information Provision in Games with Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 0508002, EconWPA.
  26. Iconio Garrì, 2008. "Politician's Reputation and Policy (Un)persistence," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0851, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  27. Englmaier, Florian & Filipi, Ales & Singh, Ravi, 2010. "Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 413-427, November.
  28. Kyna Fong, 2007. "Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons," Discussion Papers 07-043, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  29. Lan Shi & Christina Tapia, 2009. "The Disciplining Effect of Concern for Referrals for Better Informed Agents: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions," Working Papers UWEC-2009-06, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  30. Alessandro Acquisti, 2014. "Inducing Customers to Try New Goods," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 131-146, March.
  31. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, HEC Paris.
  32. Alexander Frankel & Michael Schwarz, 2009. "Experts and Their Records," NBER Working Papers 14921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  33. Junghun Cho, 2006. "Multiple Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp314, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.