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Citations for "Bad Reputation"

by Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki

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  1. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M, 2004. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Robert Gazzale & Tapan Khopkar, 2011. "Remain silent and ye shall suffer: seller exploitation of reticent buyers in an experimental reputation system," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 273-285, May.
  3. Englmaier, Florian & Filipi, Ales & Singh, Ravi, 2010. "Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority," Munich Reprints in Economics 22012, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
  5. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Jullien, Bruno & Park, In-Uck, 2009. "New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility," IDEI Working Papers 564, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 27 Jan 2014.
  7. Junghun Cho, 2008. "Sequential Cheap Talk from Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp352, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  8. repec:dgr:uvatin:20040037 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. repec:dgr:uvatin:2004037 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Dominic Rohner & Mathias Thoenig & Fabrizio Zilibottix, 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," HiCN Working Papers 95, Households in Conflict Network.
  11. Emons, Winand, 2010. "Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 7659, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Junghun Cho, 2006. "Multiple Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp314, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  13. Oliver Gürtler, 2008. "Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 177-189, July.
  14. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Dasgupta, Amil & Sarafidis, Yianis, 2009. "Managers as administrators: Reputation and incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 155-163, May.
  17. Dominik Erharter, 2012. "Credence goods markets, distributional preferences and the role of institutions," Working Papers 2012-11, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  18. Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2011. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 11/272, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  19. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA.
  20. Alexander Frankel & Michael Schwarz, 2009. "Experts and Their Records," NBER Working Papers 14921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Robert Gazzale, 2005. "Giving Gossips Their Due: Information Provision in Games with Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 0508002, EconWPA.
  22. Kyna Fong, 2007. "Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons," Discussion Papers 07-043, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  23. Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2014. "Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2014-79, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  24. Pierre-Yves Yanni, 2012. "Coarse Information and Entrepreneurial Risk Choice," 2012 Meeting Papers 1142, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  25. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, HEC Paris.
  26. Lan Shi & Christina Tapia, 2009. "The Disciplining Effect of Concern for Referrals for Better Informed Agents: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions," Working Papers UWEC-2009-06, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  27. Harasser, Andreas, 2014. "Information asymmetry and reentry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 118-121.
  28. Kunio Tsuyuhara, 2012. "An advice game with reputational and career concerns," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3480-3487.
  29. Chee Leong, 2012. "A Dynamic Game of Reputation and Economic Performances in Nondemocratic Regimes," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 385-400, December.
  30. Sabine Sedlacek & Gunther Maier, 2012. "Green Building Councils: Their Economic Role as Governance Institutions," SRE-Disc sre-disc-2012_02, Institute for Multilevel Governance and Development, Department of Socioeconomics, Vienna University of Economics and Business.
  31. Iconio Garrì, 2008. "Politician's Reputation and Policy (Un)persistence," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0851, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  32. Alessandro Acquisti, 2014. "Inducing Customers to Try New Goods," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 131-146, March.
  33. Wrasai, Phongthorn & Swank, Otto H., 2007. "Policy makers, advisers, and reputation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 579-590, April.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.