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Citations for "Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy"

by Kenneth Rogoff

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  1. Leonardo Bartolini & Allan Drazen, 1996. "When Liberal Policies Reflect External Shocks, What Do We Learn?," NBER Working Papers 5727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Roberto Cellini & Luca Lambertini, 2010. "The Issue Of Time Inconsistency Revisited As An Extended Game," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(02), pages 161-174.
  3. Ben Bernanke & Frederic Mishkin, 1992. "Central Bank Behavior and the Strategy of Monetary Policy: Observations From Six Industrialized Countries," NBER Working Papers 4082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans," Staff Report 122, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. A. Javier Hamann & Alessandro Prati, 2002. "Why Do Many Disinflations Fail? the Importance of Luck, Timing, and Political Institutions," IMF Working Papers 02/228, International Monetary Fund.
  6. T. Christopher Canavan, 1995. "Can Ignorance Make Central Banks Behave?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 291., Boston College Department of Economics.
  7. Ellis, C.J. & Holden, S., 1992. "Optimal Contract Length in a Reputational Model of Monetary Policy," Memorandum 11/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  8. Ricardo Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2001. "A "Vertical" Analysis of Crises and Intervention: Fear of Floating and Ex-ante Problems," NBER Working Papers 8428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Jensen, Christian, 2014. "Discretionary policy exploiting learning in a sticky-information model of the inflation-output trade-off: Bridging the gap to commitment," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 150-158.
  10. Reeves, Silke Fabian, 1997. "Exchange rate management when sterilized interventions represent signals of monetary policy," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 339-360.
  11. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "Strategic discipline in monetary policy with private information: optimal targeting periods," Working Papers 1990-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  12. Pierre Cahuc, 1989. "Modes de formation des salaires et stagflation : une analyse en termes de théorie des jeux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(3), pages 421-440.
  13. Herschel I. Grossman, 1991. "Monetary Economics: A Review Essay," NBER Working Papers 3686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
  15. Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(3), pages 735-754.
  16. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "When and how much to talk: credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Working Papers 1990-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  17. Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005. "Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank," NBER Working Papers 11792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Juan Ayuso Huertas, 1991. "Los efectos del anuncio de un objetivo de inflación," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 15(3), pages 627-644, September.
  19. Sebastian Edwards, 1993. "The Political Economy of Infaliton and Stabilization in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 4319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Drazen, Allan, 2000. "Interest-rate and borrowing defense against speculative attack," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 303-348, December.
  21. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June.
  22. Deissenberg, Christophe & Gonzalez, Francisco Alvarez, 2002. "Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(9-10), pages 1457-1479, August.
  23. Philippe Bacchetta & Eric van Wincoop, 2000. "Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility," NBER Chapters, in: Capital Flows and the Emerging Economies: Theory, Evidence, and Controversies, pages 61-98 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Jensen, Christian, 2013. "The gains from short-term commitments," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 14-23.
  25. Loisel, O., 2005. "Central Bank Reputation in a Forward-Looking Model," Working papers 127, Banque de France.
  26. Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
  27. Peter Ferderer, J., 1998. "The determinants of monetary target credibility," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 825-841.
  28. Allan Drazen, 1997. "Policy Signaling in the Open Economy: A Re-Examination," NBER Working Papers 5892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1997. "Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 282-305, February.
  30. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Torsten Persson & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1986. "Laws as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time Consistency Problem," NBER Working Papers 2068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Bosello, Francesco & Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo & Raggi, Davide, 2003. "Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Jon Faust, 1992. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," International Finance Discussion Papers 429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  33. Driessen, Joost & Perotti, Enrico C, 2004. "Confidence Building on Euro Conversion: Theory and Evidence from Currency Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 4180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  34. Silke Reeves, 1997. "Partial credibility and policy announcements: The problem of time inconsistency in macroeconomics revisited," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(4), pages 344-357, December.
  35. J. Peter Ferderer, 1999. "The Credibility of the Federal Reserve's Monetary Targets," Macroeconomics 9903006, EconWPA.
  36. Bar-Ilan, Avner & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2006. "Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 1043-1060, May.
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