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Partial credibility and policy announcements: The problem of time inconsistency in macroeconomics revisited

  • Silke Reeves
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02298345
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    Article provided by International Atlantic Economic Society in its journal Atlantic Economic Journal.

    Volume (Year): 25 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 344-357

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:25:y:1997:i:4:p:344-357
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    1. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine.
    2. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
    3. Robert J. Barro, 1986. "Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 1794, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Cukierman, Alex & Liviatan, Nissan, 1992. "The Dynamics of Optimal Gradual Stabilizations," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 439-58, September.
    5. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. D. Backus & J. Driffil, 1998. "Inflation and Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625, David K. Levine.
    7. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    8. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
    9. Kenneth Rogoff, 1986. "Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July.
    11. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1988. "Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales," Working papers 490, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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