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Citations for "The International Lender of Last Resort. How Large Is Large Enough?"

by Olivier Jeanne & Charles Wyplosz

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  1. Brad Setser & Ioannis Halikias & Alexander Pitt & Christoph B. Rosenberg & Brett E. House & Jens Nystedt & Christian Keller, 2005. "Debt-Related Vulnerabilities and Financial Crises," IMF Occasional Papers 240, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Goderis, B.V.G., 2007. "The Effect of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates During Currency Crises : The Role of Debt, Institutions and Financial Openness," Discussion Paper 2007-18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Thomas D. Willett, 2001. "Restructuring IMF Facilities to Separate Lender of Last Resort and Conditionality Programs: The Meltzer Commission Recommendations as Complements rather than Substitutes," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2001-28, Claremont Colleges.
  4. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
  5. Takuji Kinkyo, 2004. "Transmission channels of capital flow shocks: why Korean crisis was so severe," Working Papers 139, Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London, UK.
  6. Enrique Alberola, 2003. "Misalignment, liabilities dollarization and exchange rate adjustment in Latin America," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0309, Banco de Espa�a.
  7. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Jonathan David Ostry & Olivier Jeanne, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Beck, Roland & Weber, Sebastian, 2010. "Should larger reserve holdings be more diversified?," Working Paper Series 1193, European Central Bank.
  9. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Vives, Xavier, 2002. "Coordination failures and the lender of last resort : was Bagehot right after all?," HWWA Discussion Papers 184, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
  10. Cecile Bastidon & Philippe Gilles & Nicolas Huchet, 2008. "A Selective Bail-Out International Lending of Last Resort Model," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 9(1), pages 103-114, May.
  11. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1400, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  12. Chue, Timothy K. & Cook, David, 2008. "Sudden stops and liability dollarization: Evidence from Asia's financial intermediaries," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 436-452, September.
  13. Claudio Soto G. & Alberto Naudon D. & Eduardo López E. & Álvaro Aguirre R., 2004. "About International Reserve Adequacy: The Case of Chile," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 7(3), pages 5-34, December.
  14. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Olivier Jeanne, 2002. "“Original Sin,†Balance Sheet Crises, and the Roles of International Lending," IMF Working Papers 02/234, International Monetary Fund.
  15. Adalbert Winkler, 2010. "The Financial Crisis : A Wake-Up Call for Strengthening Regional Monitoring of Financial Markets and Regional Coordination of Financial Sector Policies?," Finance Working Papers 22022, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  16. Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Benedikt Goderis, 2007. "Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheets," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8, pages 309-343, 08.
  17. Pablo García & Claudio Soto, 2006. "Large Hoardings of International Reserves: Are They Worth It?," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Ricardo Caballero & César Calderón & Luis Felipe Céspedes & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Sc (ed.), External Vulnerability and Preventive Policies, edition 1, volume 10, chapter 6, pages 171-206 Central Bank of Chile.
  18. Claudio Soto & Alberto Naudon & Eduardo López & Alvaro Aguirre, 2004. "Acerca del Nivel Adecuado de las Reservas Internacionales," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 267, Central Bank of Chile.
  19. Weithoner, Thomas, 2006. "How can IMF policy eliminate country moral hazard and account for externalities?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(8), pages 1257-1276, December.
  20. Germana Corrado, 2005. "Liquidity Shocks, Banking System Failures, and Supranational Lending of Last Resort Facilities," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(1), pages 1-24, May.
  21. Ralph Chami & Ilhyock Shim & Sunil Sharma, 2004. "A Model of the Imf As a Coinsurance Arrangement," IMF Working Papers 04/219, International Monetary Fund.
  22. Sergio Masciantonio, 2005. "The Role of Preference Structure and Moral Hazard in a Multiple Equilibria. Model of Financial Crises," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(6), pages 135-165, November-.
  23. Patrick McGuire & Goetz von Peter, 2009. "The US dollar shortage in global banking and the international policy response," BIS Working Papers 291, Bank for International Settlements.
  24. Brad Setser & Nouriel Roubini & Christian Keller & Mark Allen & Christoph B. Rosenberg, 2002. "A Balance Sheet Approach to Financial Crisis," IMF Working Papers 02/210, International Monetary Fund.
  25. Timothy Chue & David Cook, 2004. "Sudden Stops and Liability Dollarization: Evidence from East Asian Financial Intermediaries," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 646, Econometric Society.
  26. Tobias Knedlik & Johannes Ströbel, 2006. "The role of banking portfolios in the transmission from currency crises to banking crises - potential effects of Basel II," IWH Discussion Papers 21, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
  27. Charles Wyplosz, 2007. "Is East Asia Safe from Financial Crises?," IHEID Working Papers 02-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.