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Adding a stick to the carrot? The interaction of bonuses and fines

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep, 2011. "The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 573-594.
  2. Sääksvuori, Lauri, 2013. "Voluntary formation of centralized sanctioning institutions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 150-159.
  3. Servátka, Maroš & Tucker, Steven & Vadovič, Radovan, 2011. "Words speak louder than money," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 700-709.
  4. Cunyat, Antoni & Sloof, Randolph, 2011. "Employee types and endogenous organizational design: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 553-573.
  5. Cala, Petr & Havranek, Tomas & Irsova, Zuzana & Matousek, Jindrich & Novak, Jiri, 2022. "Financial Incentives and Performance: A Meta-Analysis of Economics Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 17680, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Li-Chen Hsu, 2013. "Tax Auditing as a Public Good Game: An Experimental Study on Punishment and Compliance," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(4), pages 475-501, October.
  7. D’Agostino Elena & Lisciandra Maurizio, 2018. "Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-27, July.
  8. Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2023. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 377-399, April.
  9. Albano, Gian Luigi & Cesi, Berardino & Iozzi, Alberto, 2017. "Public procurement with unverifiable quality: The case for discriminatory competitive procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 14-26.
  10. Sangho Chae & Thomas Y. Choi & Daesik Hur, 2017. "Buyer Power and Supplier Relationship Commitment: A Cognitive Evaluation Theory Perspective," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 53(2), pages 39-60, April.
  11. Jared Rubin & Roman Sheremeta, 2016. "Principal–Agent Settings with Random Shocks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 985-999, April.
  12. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
  13. Boosey, Luke & Goerg, Sebastian, 2020. "The timing of discretionary bonuses – effort, signals, and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 254-280.
  14. Houser, Daniel & Xiao, Erte & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon, 2008. "When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 509-532, March.
  15. Andrei Bremzen & Elena Khokhlova & Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2015. "Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects Of Rewards," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 55-70, March.
  16. Tetlock, Philip E. & Vieider, Ferdinand M. & Patil, Shefali V. & Grant, Adam M., 2013. "Accountability and ideology: When left looks right and right looks left," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 22-35.
  17. Tom Lane & Daniele Nosenzo & Silvia Sonderegger, 2023. "Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(5), pages 1255-1293, May.
  18. Golman, Russell & Bhatia, Sudeep, 2012. "Performance evaluation inflation and compression," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 534-543.
  19. Maria Bigoni & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Paola Valbonesi, 2010. "Sticks and Carrots in Procurement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0105, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  20. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
  21. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2012. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 368-425, June.
  22. Bigoni Maria & Spagnolo Giancarlo & Valbonesi Paola, 2014. "Sticks and Carrots in Procurement: An Experimental Exploration," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 14(3), pages 893-936, July.
  23. Oosterbeek, Hessel & Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep, 2011. "Rent-seeking versus productive activities in a multi-task experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 630-643, June.
  24. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Oechssler, Jörg & Shah, Anwar, 2019. "Managerial bonuses and subordinate mistreatment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 509-525.
  25. Herold, Florian, 2010. "Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 180-191, January.
  26. Flynn, Sean Masaki & Donnelly, Michael, 2012. "Does labor contract completeness drive unionization? Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 445-454.
  27. Axel Engellandt & Regina T. Riphahn, 2011. "Evidence on Incentive Effects of Subjective Performance Evaluations," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 64(2), pages 241-257, January.
  28. Fluet, Claude & Mungan, Murat C., 2022. "Laws and norms with (un)observable actions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
  29. Pyddoke, Roger, 2020. "Penalties as incentives for punctuality and regularity in tendered Swedish public transport," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
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