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Citations for "extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games"

by Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.

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  1. repec:att:wimass:9205 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.
  3. Geir B. Asheim & Martin Dufwenberg, 2003. "Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 305-325, 04.
  4. Gaudeul, Alexia, 2009. "A (micro) course in microeconomic theory for MSc students," MPRA Paper 15388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society.
  6. Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November.
  7. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel, 1998. "Indenturing banknotes as a mechanism to induce cooperation in conflict games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 279-294, February.
  8. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000203, David K. Levine.
  9. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  10. Leslie M. Marx & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers 1066R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Brams, S.J., 1998. "To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises," Working Papers 98-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  12. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers 47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
  13. Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1999. "On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability," Economics Working Papers 408, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1999.
  14. George J. Mailath, 1993. "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Discussion Papers 1041, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Jeroen M. Swinkels, . "How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 045, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  16. GRIGIS DE STEFANO, Federico, 2014. "Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph," CORE Discussion Papers 2014015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Aviad Heifetz & Martin Meier & Burkhard Schipper, 2011. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Working Papers 113, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  18. Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996. "Admissibility and Common Knowledge," Discussion Paper 1996-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  19. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
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