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Robust trading mechanisms

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2017. "Reordering an existing queue," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 65-87, June.
  2. Mridu Goswami, 2015. "Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 389-422, February.
  3. Drexl, Moritz & Kleiner, Andreas, 2015. "Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 169-181.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
  5. Stefano Galavotti, 2008. "On Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Ex-Post Individually Rational Traders," Working Papers 161, Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
  6. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
  7. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Stephen Morris, 2012. "The Robustness of Robust Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 10, pages 357-373 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  8. Matthew J. Clayton & Bjorn N. Jorgensen & Kenneth A. Kavajecz, "undated". "On the Formation and Structure of International Exchanges," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 22-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  9. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017. "Club good intermediaries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 430-459.
  10. Saran, Rene, 2016. "Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 517-564.
  11. Bierbrauer, Felix & Ockenfels, Axel & Pollak, Andreas & Rückert, Désirée, 2017. "Robust mechanism design and social preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 59-80.
  12. Athey, Susan & Miller, David A., 2007. "Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
  13. repec:eee:transe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:60-77 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Thierry Marchant & Debasis Mishra, 2015. "Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 433-455, February.
  15. Miyagawa, Eiichi, 2001. "House Allocation with Transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 329-355, October.
  16. Kuzmics, Christoph & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2017. "On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 56-69.
  17. Yoon, Kiho, 2001. "The Modified Vickrey Double Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 572-584, December.
  18. Čopič, Jernej & Ponsatí, Clara, 2016. "Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 276-287.
  19. Nanyang Bu, 2016. "Joint misrepresentation with bribes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 115-125, January.
  20. Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan & D. Marc Kilgour, 2015. "A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 401-413, May.
  21. Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2007. "On Robust Constitution Design," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 241-279, May.
  22. Saran, Rene, 2011. "Bilateral trading with naive traders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 544-557, June.
  23. Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-29, CIRANO.
  24. Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, 2000. "Interim efficient allocation mechanisms," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7220, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  25. Gärtner, Dennis L. & Schmutzler, Armin, 2009. "Merger negotiations and ex-post regret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1636-1664, July.
  26. Nanyang Bu, 2016. "Joint misrepresentation with bribes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 115-125, January.
  27. Clayton, Matthew J. & Jorgensen, Bjorn N. & Kavajecz, Kenneth A., 2006. "On the presence and market-structure of exchanges around the world," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 27-48, February.
  28. Choi, Jaewon & Kim, Taesung, 1999. "A Nonparametric, Efficient Public Good Decision Mechanism: Undominated Bayesian Implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 64-85, April.
  29. Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 6844, CESifo Group Munich.
  30. Flesch, János & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries, 2016. "Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 68-75.
  31. Vermeulen A.J. & Schr?der M.J.W. & Flesch J., 2013. "The bilateral trade model in a discrete setting," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  32. Yoon, Kiho, 2008. "The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 324-336, February.
  33. Leo, Greg, 2017. "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 525-547.
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