IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!)

Citations for "Competitive signalling"

by Riley, John G.

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with 'Third Party' Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance," Finance 0411028, EconWPA.
  2. Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1987. "An economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 271-289, June.
  3. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2011. "Banks' risk race: A signaling explanation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 784-791, October.
  4. Daniel L. McFadden & Carlos E. Noton & Pau Olivella, 2012. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," NBER Working Papers 17938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  6. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March.
  7. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001035, David K. Levine.
  8. Paul W. Miller & Charles Mulvey & Nick Martin, 2004. "A Test of the Sorting Model of Education in Australia," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 04-12, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
  9. Kwang Soo Cheong, 1997. "Corporate Income Taxation and Signaling," Working Papers 199713, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  10. Feldman, David, 2004. "Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 93-101, July.
  11. Andrew Clark, 2000. "Signalling and Screening in a Transition Economy: Three Empirical Models Applied to Russia," CERT Discussion Papers 0003, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
  12. David P. Baron, 1978. "Price Regulation, Quality, and Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Naiditch, Claire & Vranceanu, Radu, 2009. "Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device," ESSEC Working Papers DR 09015, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
  14. Soumyanetra Munshi, 2014. "'Arranged' Marriage, Education, and Dowry: A Contract-Theoretic Perspective," Working Papers id:5696, eSocialSciences.
  15. Giuseppe, DE FEO & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2005. "Efficiency of Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  16. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Gerhard Clemenz & Mona Ritthaler, 1992. "Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 12-26, Spring.
  18. Damoiselet, Nathalie, 1998. "Effets des systèmes scolaires sur le comportement éducatif individuel," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(1), pages 29-62, mars.
  19. Hellmuth Milde & John G. Riley, 1986. "Signalling in Credit Markets," UCLA Economics Working Papers 334, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
  21. Feldman, David & Winer, Russell S., 2004. "Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 81-91, July.
  22. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence," Discussion Papers 1274, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  23. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00424214 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1985. "Vers une tarification équitable de l’assurance?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 61(4), pages 453-471, décembre.
  25. John G. Riley, 1984. "Competitive Signalling Reconsidered," UCLA Economics Working Papers 294, UCLA Department of Economics.
  26. David Feldman & Charles Trzcinka & Russell Winer, 2015. "Pricing under noisy signaling," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 435-454, August.
  27. Srikant Devaraj & Pankaj C Patel, 2016. "Influence of number of backers, goal amount, and project duration on meeting funding goals of crowdfunding projects," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 1242-1249.
  28. Stamland, Tommy, 1999. "Partially Informative Signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 148-161, November.
  29. Kinvi D.A. Logossah, 1994. "Capital humain et croissance économique : une revue de la littérature," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 116(5), pages 17-34.
  30. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1987. "Turnover wages and adverse selection," Working Paper 8717, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  31. Andrey Aistov, 2012. "Is Education a Signal on the Russian Labour Market?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 05/EDU/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  32. Bruce D. Smith, 1982. "Human capital investment, and the inefficiency of compensation based on marginal productivity: the static case," Working Papers 205, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  33. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, . "Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-21, Claremont Colleges.
  34. Michael Spence, 2002. "Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 434-459, June.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.