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Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  3. Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Communication and Bargaining in the Spatial Model," Papers 09-20-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  4. Agastya, Murali & Menezes, Flavio & Sengupta, Kunal, 2007. "Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-19, July.
  5. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2008. "Rules of proof, courts, and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 20-40, March.
  6. Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Melissas, 2006. "Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 297-325, February.
  7. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
  8. Kenichi Amaya, 2004. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Pre-Play Communication and Efficiency in Games," Discussion Paper Series 165, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  9. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2023. "Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(4), pages 957-992, December.
  10. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2018. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints," AMSE Working Papers 1856, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jul 2019.
  11. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 438, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  12. Ganna Pogrebna & David Krantz & Christian Schade & Claudia Keser, 2011. "Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 473-502, October.
  13. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  14. Hammad Siddiqi, 2007. "Stock Price Manipulation : The Role of Intermediaries," Finance Working Papers 22280, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  15. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006. "Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections," Working Paper 325, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Dec 2008.
  16. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2014. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans," Vienna Economics Papers vie1409, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  17. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers P181, FERDI.
  18. Crettez, Bertrand & Deloche, Régis, 2013. "On experimental economics and the comparison between the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 66-72.
  19. Chakraborty, Archishman & Harbaugh, Rick, 2007. "Comparative cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 70-94, January.
    • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2004. "Comparative Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2004-08, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  20. He, Simin & Offerman, Theo & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2019. "The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 238-273.
  21. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 145-179, March.
  22. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  23. Jin, Ye & Zhou, Zhen & Brandenburger, Adam, 2023. "Coordination via delay: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 23-49.
  24. Venkatesh, Raghul S, 2017. "Cheap Talk with Strategic Substitutability," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 31, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  25. Feiqiong Chen & Qiaoshuang Meng & Fei Li, 2017. "How resource information backgrounds trigger post-merger integration and technology innovation? A dynamic analysis of resource similarity and complementarity," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 167-198, June.
  26. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
  27. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369.
  28. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2019. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints in International Alliances," Working Papers halshs-01962239, HAL.
  29. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2014. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans," Vienna Economics Papers 1409, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  30. Brenton Kenkel, 2019. "The efficacy of cheap talk in collective action problems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 370-402, July.
  31. Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & William D. Schulze & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "Communication and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Group Performance: An Experimental Study of Nonpoint Pollution Control," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(4), pages 599-613, October.
  32. Melody Lo, 2021. "Language and coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 49-92, July.
  33. Alonso, Ricardo, 2009. "Strategic control and strategic communication," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58682, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  34. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 477-486.
  35. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2015. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 517, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  36. Kenichi Amaya, 2006. "Two-Speed Evolution with Pre-Play Communication and Limited Flexibility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 310-325, April.
  37. Gert Brunekreeft, 2011. "Vertical Relations and Energy Networks: Selected Issues," Chapters, in: Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon & Adrien de Hauteclocque (ed.), Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  38. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007.
  39. Christoph Feldhaus & Julia Stauf, 2016. "More than words: the effects of cheap talk in a volunteer’s dilemma," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 342-359, June.
  40. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2019. "Strategic communication with reporting costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 341-363, October.
  41. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
  42. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2021. "Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 867-889, December.
  43. Edoardo Grillo, 2013. "Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 331, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
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