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Citations for "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games"

by Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M

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  1. Mailath George J. & Samuelson Larry & Swinkels Jeroen M., 1994. "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 325-371, December.
  2. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers 47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
  3. Asheim, Geir B, 2000. "Deductive reasoning in Extensive Games," Research Papers in Economics 2000:7, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  4. Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996. "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers 9611, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  5. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  6. repec:dgr:kubcen:199616 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. GRIGIS DE STEFANO, Federico, 2014. "Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph," CORE Discussion Papers 2014015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
  9. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000203, David K. Levine.
  10. Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1999. "On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability," Economics Working Papers 408, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1999.
  11. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C, 2009. "Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior," MPRA Paper 15058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2000. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 324-329, May.
  13. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "Proper consistency," Memorandum 31/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  14. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  15. Brams, S.J., 1998. "To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises," Working Papers 98-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  16. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.
  17. Gaudeul, Alexia, 2009. "A (micro) course in microeconomic theory for MSc students," MPRA Paper 15388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996. "Admissibility and Common Knowledge," Discussion Paper 1996-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  19. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel, 1998. "Indenturing banknotes as a mechanism to induce cooperation in conflict games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 279-294, February.
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