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Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production

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Cited by:

  1. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.
  2. Jonathan Glover & Eunhee Kim, 2021. "Optimal Team Composition: Diversity to Foster Implicit Team Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5800-5820, September.
  3. Ashintya Damayati & Chaikal Nuryakin & Muhammad Halley Yudhistira & Teguh Dartanto, 2024. "Industrial location policy, exporting activity, and firms’ collusive behavior: scrutinizing the unintended effect of industrial location policy in Indonesia," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 51(4), pages 815-858, December.
  4. Colombo, Stefano, 2013. "Cartels in the unidirectional Hotelling model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 690-696.
  5. Abito, Jose Miguel & Chen, Cuicui, 2023. "A partial identification framework for dynamic games," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
  6. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2023. "Self-evident events and the value of linking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  7. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2015. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2072/260962, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  8. Maria Bigoni & Jan Potters & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2019. "Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion: an experiment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(4), pages 827-844, November.
  9. Emilio Calvano & Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicolò & Sergio Pastorello, 2019. "Algorithmic Pricing What Implications for Competition Policy?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(1), pages 155-171, August.
  10. Ryota Iijima & Akitada Kasahara, 2016. "Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring," ISER Discussion Paper 0965, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
  11. Joao Ramos & Tomasz Sadzik, 2018. "Partnership with Persistence," 2018 Meeting Papers 1264, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  12. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2015. "Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals," Working Papers 2072/249233, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  13. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  14. Batlome Janjgava & Sergey Slobodyan, 2011. "Duopoly Competition, Escape Dynamics and Non-cooperative Collusion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp445, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  15. Zhang, Bobo & Zhang, Zhou, 2022. "Shining light on corporate political spending: Evidence from shareholder engagements," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  16. Aichele, Markus, 2013. "Abuse of forward contracts to semi-collude in volatile markets," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79755, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  17. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2013. "Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000685, David K. Levine.
  18. Maria Bigoni & Marco Casari & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 587-616, March.
  19. Emilio Calvano & Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicolò & Sergio Pastorello, 2020. "Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3267-3297, October.
  20. Richter, Michael, 2014. "Fully absorbing dynamic compromise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 92-104.
  21. Harstad, Bård & Lancia, Francesco & Russo, Alessia, 2022. "Prices vs. quantities for self-enforcing agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
  22. Dirk Hackbarth & Bart Taub, 2022. "Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5364-5383, July.
  23. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2025. "Non-recursive dynamic incentives: a rate of convergence approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(4), November.
  24. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
  25. Park, Jee-Hyeong, 2009. "Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and a Possible Role for the WTO," CCES Discussion Paper Series 19, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  26. Fagart, Thomas, 2022. "Collusion in capacity under irreversible investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
  27. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Henri Pages & Dylan Possamaï, 2014. "A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 39-73, January.
  29. Osório António M., 2012. "A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-27, April.
  30. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2012. "The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments," Working Papers 2072/203171, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  31. Simon Board & Moritz Meyer‐ter‐Vehn, 2013. "Reputation for Quality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2381-2462, November.
  32. Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
  33. David A. Miller, 2012. "Robust Collusion with Private Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 778-811.
  34. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring"," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 237-237, January.
  35. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2019. "Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
  36. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2009. "Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and a Possible Role for the WTO," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd09-063, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  37. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-3751, November.
  39. Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
  40. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Potters, Jan & Bigoni, Maria, 2012. "Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 8877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  41. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107069978, January.
  42. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 233-265.
  43. J. Aislinn Bohren, 2011. "Stochastic Games in Continuous Time: Persistent Actions in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Aug 2014.
  44. Kim, Daehyun & Obara, Ichiro, 0. "Asymptotic value of monitoring structures in stochastic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  45. António Osório, 2018. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 387-404, August.
  46. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
  47. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2012. "Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 636-647.
  48. Jeanine Miklós-Thal & Catherine Tucker, 2019. "Collusion by Algorithm: Does Better Demand Prediction Facilitate Coordination Between Sellers?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1552-1561, April.
  49. Osório, António (António Miguel), 2017. "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Working Papers 2072/290761, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  50. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2011. "Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions," Working Papers 2072/179668, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  51. Bohren, J. Aislinn, 2024. "Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
  52. Harrington, Joseph E., 2017. "The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 78-81.
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