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Abuse of forward contracts to semi-collude in volatile markets

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  • Aichele, Markus

Abstract

I model the optimal semi-collusive strategy of firms using forward contracts in volatile markets. It has been shown that forward contracts can be used to stabilize a collusive agreement under deterministic (Liski and Montero, 2006) as well as under stochastic market conditions (Aichele, 2012). However, forward trading has a negative effect on the expected profit for collusive firms, since firms have the obligation to fulfill their forward contracts in booms as well as in recessions. Thus, in recessions firms involuntarily sell more than the optimal collusive amount. This profit decreasing effect of forward trading is in contrast to the existing literature, since under certainty forward trading does not alter the collusive profit.

Suggested Citation

  • Aichele, Markus, 2013. "Abuse of forward contracts to semi-collude in volatile markets," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79755, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79755
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, 1995. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 19-32, January.
    2. Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1794-1823, December.
    3. Fabra, Natalia & Toro, Juan, 2005. "Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 155-181, April.
    4. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    5. Liski, Matti & Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2006. "Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 212-230, November.
    6. Mouraviev, Igor & Rey, Patrick, 2011. "Collusion and leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 705-717.
    7. Adilov, Nodir, 2012. "Strategic use of forward contracts and capacity constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 164-173.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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