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Citations for "Bad Reputation"

by Jeffrey Ely & Jusso Valimaki

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  1. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M, 2004. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Robert S. Gazzale & Tapan Khopkar, 2008. "Remain Silent and Ye Shall Suffer: Seller Exploitation of Reticent Buyers in an Experimental Reputation System," Department of Economics Working Papers 2008-22, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  4. Oliver Gürtler, 2008. "Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 177-189, July.
  5. Englmaier, Florian & Filipi, Ales & Singh, Ravi, 2010. "Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 327, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Rohner, D. & Thoenig, M. & Zilibotti, F., 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1136, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  7. Sabine Sedlacek & Gunther Maier, 2012. "Green Building Councils: Their Economic Role as Governance Institutions," SRE-Disc sre-disc-2012_02, Institute for Multilevel Governance and Development, Department of Socioeconomics, Vienna University of Economics and Business.
  8. Emons, Winand, 2010. "Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 7659, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Dasgupta, Amil & Sarafidis, Yianis, 2009. "Managers as administrators: Reputation and incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 155-163, May.
  11. Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
  12. Junghun Cho, 2006. "Multiple Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp314, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  13. Junghun Cho, 2008. "Sequential Cheap Talk from Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp352, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  14. Kunio Tsuyuhara, 2012. "An advice game with reputational and career concerns," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3480-3487.
  15. Wrasai, Phongthorn & Swank, Otto H., 2007. "Policy makers, advisers, and reputation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 579-590, April.
  16. Iconio Garrì, 2008. "Politician's Reputation and Policy (Un)persistence," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0851, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  17. Chee Leong, 2012. "A Dynamic Game of Reputation and Economic Performances in Nondemocratic Regimes," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 385-400, December.
  18. Alessandro Acquisti, 2014. "Inducing Customers to Try New Goods," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 131-146, March.
  19. Kyna Fong, 2007. "Evaluating Skilled Experts: Optimal Scoring Rules for Surgeons," Discussion Papers 07-043, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  20. Dominik Erharter, 2012. "Credence goods markets, distributional preferences and the role of institutions," Working Papers 2012-11, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  21. Lan Shi & Christina Tapia, 2009. "The Disciplining Effect of Concern for Referrals for Better Informed Agents: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions," Working Papers UWEC-2009-06, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  22. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Alexander Frankel & Michael Schwarz, 2009. "Experts and Their Records," NBER Working Papers 14921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA.
  25. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, HEC Paris.
  26. Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2011. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 11/272, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  27. Pierre-Yves Yanni, 2012. "Coarse Information and Entrepreneurial Risk Choice," 2012 Meeting Papers 1142, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  28. Robert Gazzale, 2005. "Giving Gossips Their Due: Information Provision in Games with Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 0508002, EconWPA.
  29. Harasser, Andreas, 2014. "Information asymmetry and reentry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 118-121.
  30. Phongthorn Wrasai & Otto H. Swank, 2004. "Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 09 Dec 2004.
  31. Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2014. "Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2014-79, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  32. Phongthorn Wrasai & Otto H. Swank, 2004. "Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 09 Dec 2004.
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