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Citations for "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting"

by Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson

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  1. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jan 2006.
  2. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00624288 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond, 2012. "Incentive provision when contracting is costly," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2012/16, University of Stavanger.
  4. Liu, Zhiyong & Avraham, Ronen, 2012. "Ex ante versus ex post expectation damages," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 339-355.
  5. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2012. "The Tenuous Relationship between Effort and Performance Pay," Discussion Papers 2012/8, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  6. James R. Brennan & Joel Watson, 2013. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 347-347, July.
  7. Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010. "Private ordering, collective action, and the self-enforcing range of contracts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 131-153, February.
  8. B. Boockmann & Paul Thurner, 2006. "Flexibility provisions in multilateral environmental treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-135, June.
  9. Hensher, David A. & Ho, Chinh & Knowles, Louise, 2016. "Efficient contracting and incentive agreements between regulators and bus operators: The influence of risk preferences of contracting agents on contract choice," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 22-40.
  10. Joel Watson, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010. "Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00624288, HAL.
  12. Marian Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller & Sebastian Stolorz, 2015. "Rigidity of Public Contracts," NBER Working Papers 21186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Gordanier, John & Miao, Chun-Hui, 2011. "On the duration of technology licensing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 755-765.
  14. C. Manuel Willington, "undated". "Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv144, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  15. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2009. "Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2193-2208, December.
  16. Matthew Ellman, 2004. "Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments," Working Papers 150, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  17. Lejot , Paul & Arner, Douglas & Schou-Zibell, Lotte, 2008. "Securitization in East Asia," Working Papers on Regional Economic Integration 12, Asian Development Bank.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 23-31.
  19. Albert Choi & George Triantis, 2008. "Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 503-534, 06.
  20. Steven Shavell, 2003. "On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts," NBER Working Papers 10094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Anjana Susarla, 2012. "Contractual Flexibility, Rent Seeking, and Renegotiation Design: An Empirical Analysis of Information Technology Outsourcing Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(7), pages 1388-1407, July.
  22. Armelle Mazé, 2005. "Contract Law and the self-enforcing range of contracts in agriculture," Working Papers halshs-00354960, HAL.
  23. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Contracts, Holdup, and Legal Intervention," NBER Working Papers 11284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  25. Joel Watson, 2013. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 457-457, August.
  26. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2014. "A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement," MPRA Paper 53504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. Maze, Armelle, 2006. "Multilateral reputation mechanisms and contract law in agriculture : complement or substitutes," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21285, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  28. Darius Lakdawalla & Eric Talley, 2006. "Optimal Liability for Terrorism," NBER Working Papers 12578, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt63s1s3j6, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  30. Steven Shavell, 2007. "Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 325-354, 06.
  31. Evelyn Korn & Stephan Meisenzahl, 2009. "Contracting still matters! Or: How to design a letter of intent," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200909, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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